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VIII. Conclusion.................................................................................. 1971
I. Introduction
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) played an important role in the financial
crisis that began in the summer of 2007 with problems in the United States
subprime mortgage market.1 CRAs have been criticized for misconstruing
the risks associated with complex financial instruments that fueled the
United States housing bubble, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs)
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).2 MBSs are fixed-income
securities created from pools of mortgage loans, which are sold to investors
who acquire rights in the income from the mortgage pools.3 Companies
will purchase pools of individual mortgages from primary lenders,
repackage them as bonds, and then sell interests in the pools to investors.4
1. See Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of
the Crisis 1 (Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-015, July 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427167 ("A primary cause
of the recent credit market turmoil was overdependence on credit ratings and credit rating
agencies."). The financial crisis that started in the United States quickly turned into a
massive global recession. See Siegried Utzig, The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of
Credit Rating Agencies: A European Banking Perspective 1 (ADBI Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 188, Jan. 2010), available at http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.01.26.wp188.credit.
rating.agencies.european.banking.pdf (stating that the recent financial crisis, which began in
2007 in the United States, has since taken on global dimensions).
2. See Stephane Rousseau, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies After the Financial
Crisis: The Long and Winding Road Toward Accountability 4–5 (Capital Markets Institute
of the University of Toronto, Paper, July 23, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1456708 (stating that CRAs "played a significant role in the market turmoil
because of the characteristics of structured finance products which made investors
particularly dependent on ratings"). Although CRAs are blameworthy, Rousseau also notes
that "the credit market turmoil is the product of a perfect storm resulting from failures on the
part of issuers, intermediaries, investors, regulators and governments." Id. at 4.
3. See Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 09-CV1110(HB), 2011 WL 135821, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing how MBSs are created)
(citing N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., Plc., 720 F. Supp. 2d
254, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)); SEC, Mortgage-Backed Securities (July 23, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For more information regarding the process of
securitization, see infra Part III.
4. See Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 2011 WL 135821, at *2 ("To sell the pass-through
certificates to investors, the issuing trust must return the certificates to the depositor, who, in
turn, passes the certificates to one or more underwriters. The underwriters offer the
certificates."). The interests in the pool derive their value from the underlying mortgages.
Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L.
309, 313 (2011).
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These companies use the cash flows from the underlying mortgages to pay
investors who bought chunks of the MBSs.5 CDOs are "more complex
pools-of-pools" of mortgages; they are pools of different structured
products, such as MBS tranches.6
Following the financial crisis, a heated debate emerged about CRAs,
the rating process, and CRA liability because market participants lost
confidence in credit ratings associated with MBSs and CDOs.7 In addition,
many investors sued various CRAs in the wake of the financial crisis for
violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)8 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),9 fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
breach of fiduciary duty, and abuse of control.10 For the most part,
however, CRAs have been successful in avoiding liability because of
5. See Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 2011 WL 135821, at *2 (describing how
"payments of interest and principal on the underlying loans . . . are collected by the loan
servicer and distributed, through the issuing trust, to investors at regular intervals throughout
the life of the loans").
6. Bruner, supra note 4, at 313; see also REPUBLICAN COMM’RS ON THE FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS PRIMER: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE CAUSES OF
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 5 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://keithhennessey.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/Financial-Crisis-Primer.pdf ("A CDO is a pool of different
structured products, such as MBS tranches, created in order to provide additional
diversification to the investment and thus, in theory, lower risks."). Structured products are
complex financial instruments that combine payments from a pool of underlying assets into
custom packages with different risk and return profiles. HERWIG M. LANGOHR & PATRICIA
T. LANGOHR, THE RATING AGENCIES AND THEIR CREDIT RATINGS: WHAT THEY ARE, HOW
THEY WORK AND WHY THEY ARE RELEVANT 141 (2008). The custom packages are referred
to as tranches. "‘[S]tructured’ finance instruments are so called precisely due to the active
process that goes into defining the properties of each class of security." Id. MBSs and
CDOs are two specific types of structured finance products. See Senate Passes Tough
Rating-Agency Amendments, CREDIT RATING AGENCY L. BLOG (May 13, 2010),
http://ratingagencylawblog.wordpress.com/2010/05/13/franken-and-lemieux-amendments/
(last visited Nov. 29, 2011) ("‘Structured products’ is a broad category that embraces the
‘alphabet soup’ of novel, complex, and/or opaque securities (asset-backed securities (ABS),
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), and so forth) that
have attracted so much attention during the financial crisis.") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
7. See Utzig, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that CRAs contributed to the recent financial
crisis, and as a result, there were calls for greater regulation of CRAs).
8. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006).
10. Caleb Deats, Talk That Isn’t Cheap: Does the First Amendment Protect Credit
Rating Agencies’ Faulty Methodologies From Regulation?, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1818, 1818
(2010); see also Larry P. Ellsworth & Keith V. Porapaiboon, Credit Rating Agencies in the
Spotlight: A New Casualty of the Mortgage Meltdown, 18 BUS. L. TODAY 1–2 (2009),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2009-03-04/ellsworth.shtml (describing
various claims brought by investors against CRAs).
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various exemptions and defenses.11 In 2010, Congress passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
to restore confidence in the United States financial system.12 Eighteen of
the Act’s 848 pages address CRA accountability and the defenses that have
allowed CRAs to escape civil liability.13
This Note evaluates whether new CRA procedures and government
regulations, created by the Dodd-Frank Act, will increase accountability of
CRAs, specifically nationally recognized statistical rating organizations
(NRSROs), or whether rating agencies will continue to avoid liability for
their inaccurate ratings despite the Dodd-Frank Act.
Part II provides readers with a broad overview of CRAs and the
development of CRAs throughout the twentieth century. Part III discusses
the process of securitization and explains the role CRAs played in the
recent financial crisis that began in 2007. Part IV then explains how CRAs
successfully avoided liability before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Part IV specifically focuses on various regulatory exemptions and
constitutional defenses traditionally afforded CRAs. Part V discusses the
Dodd-Frank Act with regard to CRAs. Part V also explains how the DoddFrank Act will affect CRA liability in the future. Part VI describes and
evaluates various alternatives to credit ratings. Part VII analyzes the
barriers to CRA liability after the Dodd-Frank Act. Finally, Part VIII offers
conclusions.
Ultimately, this Note proposes that CRAs will be unable to avoid
liability in the future for inaccurate ratings with regard to complex
structured products. The CRAs’ First Amendment defense should not be
successful in future litigation involving MBSs and CDOs. Although the
threat of improper liability will deter CRA misconduct, it could also lead to
crushing liability for CRAs. Courts should mitigate the risk of crushing
liability by imposing a liability cap on damages.

11. See Ellsworth & Porapaiboon, supra note 10, at 2.
12. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] ("An Act [t]o promote
the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes.").
13. John Lippert, Credit Ratings Can’t Claim Free Speech in Law Giving New Risks,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-08/credit-ratingscan-t-claim-free-speech-in-law-bringing-risks-to-companies.html (last visited Nov. 29,
2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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II. Credit Rating Agencies
A. The Origins of CRAs
Credit rating agencies began in the United States in the beginning of
the twentieth century and now have a global presence.14 The development
of CRAs is directly related "to the rise of the bond markets which began in
the United States because of the need to raise capital for the railroads."15
Initially, the specialized press, credit reporting agencies, and investment
bankers provided investors with the information that CRAs currently
supply.16 The specialized business press reported on business conditions
for companies and industries, and credit-reporting agencies evaluated the
ability of merchants to pay their financial obligations.17 Investment banks
stabilized the financial markets by putting their reputations at stake every
time they underwrote debt.18 The consolidation of these functions laid the
foundation for the current CRA industry.19 John Moody founded the first
CRA in 1909 by combining the functions of the specialized business press,
credit reporting agencies, and investment bankers.20

14. Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the
United States, 54 AM. J. COM. L. (Supplemental Issue) 341, 342 (2006).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 342–43.
17. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 376 (describing the functions of the
specialized business and financial press and credit reporting agencies).
18. See id. (stating that investment banks’ reputation capital "was the third proxy for
credit rating agencies").
19. See id. (stating that the first CRA combined the functions of the specialized
business press, credit-reporting agencies, and investment banks "in a single business, laying
the foundation of the CRA industry and its reputation capital").
20. See id. at 375–76 (explaining the development of the CRA industry during the
beginning of the twentieth century); see also Christopher M. Bruner & Rawi Abdelal, To
Judge Leviathan: Sovereign Credit Ratings, National Law, and the World Economy, 25 J.
PUB. POL’Y 191, 194 (2005) ("[C]redit ‘ratings’ as such were an innovation of the early
twentieth century, and specifically a response to modern industry and its massive appetite for
private capital."); Theresa Nagy, Note, Credit Rating Agencies and the First
Amendment: Applying Constitutional Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage
Litigation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 140, 143 (2009) (describing the emergence of CRAs at the
beginning of the twentieth century).

1930

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1925 (2011)
B. The Function of CRAs and Credit Ratings

CRAs are supposed to be critical gatekeepers to the securities
markets.21
They assess the creditworthiness of companies and
governments that issue debt and assign ratings to various fixed-income
securities, including complex structured products.22 Credit ratings fill the
information gap between borrowers and investors.23
Ratings are
evaluations of how likely issuers are to make timely payments on their
debt obligations, and they also assess the probability of default with
respect to specific fixed-income securities.24 Credit ratings are relative,
not absolute, measures of creditworthiness.25 Ratings are an assessment
of one issuer’s credit soundness relative to other issuers.26 Generally,
ratings are considered opinions regarding the creditworthiness of a
particular company, security, or obligation.27 They are not guarantees
21. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) ("[CRAs] are the universally feared gatekeepers
for the issuance and trading of debt securities . . . ." (citing The Use and Abuse of
Reputation, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 18)); see also Pinto, supra note 14, at 343 (stating
that CRAs are considered "one of the outside ‘gatekeepers’ who act as reputational
intermediaries by evaluating issuers in order to protect outside investors").
22. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 23 ("According to the European
Commission, ‘Credit rating agencies issue opinions on the creditworthiness of a particular
issuer or financial instrument. . . . [T]hey assess the likelihood that an issuer will default
either on its financial obligations generally (issuer rating) or on a particular debt or fixed
income security (instrument rating)’ . . . ."); Rousseau, supra note 2, at 13–14 (explaining
that some CRAs provide ratings, solicited or unsolicited, on debt issuers in a given
marketplace using statistical models).
23. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 89 ("Credit ratings are an information
good at the intersection between borrowers and investors, respectively the demand and
supply for capital.").
24. See Rousseau, supra note 2, at 15 (stating that CRAs provide an evaluation of
issuer creditworthiness and the safety of specific fixed-income securities).
25. LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 50. "Ratings are relative measures of risk;
as a result, the assignment of ratings in the same category to entities and obligations may not
fully reflect small differences in the degrees of risk." Definitions of Ratings and Other
Forms of Opinion, FITCHRATINGS, 4 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.fitch
ratings.com/web_content/ratings/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_scales.pdf.
26. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 50 ("Ratings exist for a large and
diverse group of entities and debt instruments, which allows investors to assign an individual
issuer or debt instrument a credit risk class vis-à-vis the overall universe of debt issuers and
instruments.").
27. See id. at 89 (stating how the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the Committee of European
Securities Regulators define credit ratings). CRAs prefer to characterize their ratings as
"opinions" because "it supports their claim that they are ‘publishers,’" and historically, this
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against default.28 By issuing various ratings, CRAs help to increase the
efficiency of capital markets.29
Credit ratings serve three main functions: to measure credit risk, to
provide a means of comparison between different securities issues, and to
provide market participants with a common standard to refer to credit risk.30
The primary objective of credit ratings, however, is to eliminate
information asymmetries in credit markets.31 Many investors are ignorant
of what goes on in a company.32 By issuing credit ratings, CRAs provide
fixed income investors with information that is generally only available to
company insiders.33 When evaluating a security or company, CRAs
consider capacity to meet financial obligations, exposure to business
conditions, and the consequences of actual default.34 CRAs assign their
ratings a letter grade, the highest usually being AAA, with lower grades
moving down the alphabet.35 These ratings help investors and regulators
characterization was accurate. Lawrence J. White, Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies, 24
J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 212 n.2 (Spring 2010). However, today, credit ratings probably cannot
be characterized as opinions in all situations. See infra Part VII (explaining that CRAs
should not be considered members of the press in the CDO and MBS context). "One
implication [of characterizing credit ratings as opinions] is that the credit rating agencies
thus enjoy the protections of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when they are
sued by investors and by issuers who claim that they have been injured by the actions of the
agencies." White, supra, at 212 n.2. However, CRAs emphasize that their ratings are not
buy or sell recommendations regarding particular securities. Rousseau, supra note 2, at 15.
28. Standard & Poor’s, Credit Ratings Definitions & FAQs, http://www.
standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See Rousseau, supra note 2, at 15 ("[T]he activities of CRAs can contribute to the
efficiency of capital markets by rectifying some of the information asymmetries that exist
between issuers and investors.").
30. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 89–91 (describing the three main
functions of credit ratings).
31. See Anthony M. Santomero, Foreword to HERWIG M. LANGOHR & PATRICIA T.
LANGOHR, THE RATING AGENCIES AND THEIR CREDIT RATINGS: WHAT THEY ARE, HOW
THEY WORK AND WHY THEY ARE RELEVANT, at x (2008) ("Credit rating agencies and their
output play a unique . . . role in overcoming the information asymmetries that are endemic to
the capital market.").
32. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 9 ("One of the most critical
impediments to investor rights is their ignorance of what goes on in a company, i.e. the
information asymmetry between outside investors and insiders who control company
operations.").
33. See id. at 9 (explaining that the aim of credit rating agencies is "to remedy the
information shortage for fixed income investors" that develops from the information
asymmetry between outside investors and company insiders).
34. Id. at 75.
35. See Christopher Alessi & Roya Wolverson, The Credit Rating Controversy,
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distinguish between investment grade securities—securities that are rated at
least BBB on the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) scale—and speculative
securities, or junk bonds.36 A high credit rating is generally more attractive
to conservative investors because it signals low credit risk.37 However,
some investors might find lower-rated securities more attractive because
they provide a higher return.38 Ratings are reduced as the capacity to meet
financial obligations decreases and business or economic conditions
deteriorate.39 These ratings are highly valued by investors, who rely on
CRAs to analyze and assess the risks associated with various financial
transactions.40 Credit ratings not only reduce the cost of information for
investors,41 but they also improve a borrower’s ability to raise capital.42
C. Factors that Shaped the Current CRA Industry
Six main factors shaped the current CRA industry: financial
disintermediation, institutionalization of investments, accelerated rate of
industry change, complex financial innovations, the globalization of capital
markets, and the growth of regulatory uses of ratings.43 Financial
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/publication/22328/
credit_rating_controversy.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (describing briefly the
characterization of raters’ opinions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. White, supra note 27, at 213.
37. Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 8.
38. See Rousseau, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining that some individual investors may
prefer to purchase lower-rated securities if they receive appropriate compensation for the
additional risk).
39. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 75 (explaining that a CRA will reduce
credit ratings as the level of adversity increases).
40. See Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 3 (explaining that investors rely on rating agencies
for comfort regarding the risks associated with payment of debt securities); see also Alessi &
Wolverson, supra note 35 ("Credit rating agencies are meant to provide global investors with
an informed analysis of the risk associated with debt securities."). The success of a CRA is
directly related to the CRA’s reputation. CRAs offer their reputation as a guarantee of the
quality of an issuer. See Rousseau, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that CRAs act as certifying
agents by offering their reputation as a guarantee).
41. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 89 (stating that CRAs reduce the cost
of information for investors and the cost of market access for borrowers by decreasing the
distance between lenders and borrowers).
42. See id. at 94 (stating that ratings provide issuers with greater access to the public
bond markets). Ratings open up "a wider range of funding alternatives in terms of size,
length of maturity, geographic market, diversity of instruments and investor base, range of
currencies and covenant packages." Id.
43. Id. at 378.
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disintermediation is the substitution of bank loans with securities.44 This
substitution increased the demand for bond ratings and due diligence.45 In
the past, banks had loaned deposits to borrowers based on their own credit
assessments.46 However, as depositors began to invest their money
elsewhere and borrowers found market-based sources of capital, the
relationship between banks, as the original provider of funds, and borrowers
dwindled.47 Banks realized that they had no logical business reasons to
incur the costs of credit analysis for bonds,48 and CRAs took advantage of
the banks’ withdrawal from long-term lending to corporations.49
The use of bond ratings in institutional investors’ portfolio allocations
and the accelerating rate of industry change created new opportunities for
CRAs as well.50 The global financial system relies on CRAs to evaluate the
prospects of the ever-increasing number of issuers.51 In addition, increased
financial innovation, particularly with regard to structured products, has
facilitated disintermediation and the expansion of capital markets.52 This
expansion creates more uncertainty in the credit markets and widens the
information gap between investors and issuers.53 Consequently, credit
rating is "an ever more important source of qualified credit information."54

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Bruner & Abdelal, supra note 20, at 196 ("Traditionally banks have taken in
money from depositors (the banks’ creditors), and then lent it to borrowers based on their
own credit evaluations, and at their own risk.").
47. See id. (explaining that banks have been marginalized from the traditional lending
process as "depositors have put their money elsewhere and borrowers have found other
sources of capital (mutual funds, for instance)").
48. Id.
49. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 378–79 (stating that CRAs filled the
gap created by financial disintermediation after commercial and investment banks stopped
performing their own credit analysis for bonds).
50. Id. at 379–80.
51. See id. (explaining that industry change makes it harder to apprehend an issuer’s
future and makes it more efficient for investors to diversify, and as a result, CRAs are
incentivized to deepen their ratings and broaden their spectrum).
52. See id. at 382 (explaining how complex financial innovations have facilitated
disintermediation and capital market expansion and, as a result, stimulated the need for
CRAs).
53. See id. at 380 (stating that the increasing number of issuers makes it more difficult
for a good company to convince investors that it is a valuable investment).
54. Id. at 383.
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D. The Development of CRAs in the 1970s

During the 1970s, CRAs benefited from the default of $82 million in
the market for commercial paper of Penn Central and from numerous
changes to the credit rating industry.55 Prior to the default, investors relied
on the reputation of the issuer in making investment decisions.56 However,
after the default, issuers of commercial paper asked CRAs to rate their
notes.57 This also allowed CRAs to shift the cost of ratings from
subscribers to issuers.58 Initially, credit ratings were financed through
investors.59 However, demand for CRAs increased following the Penn
Central default, and CRAs began to charge issuers for their ratings.60 There
are several reasons why CRAs might have changed their business model
from an investor-pays system to an issuer-pays model. First, CRAs were
concerned that too many investors would obtain ratings from subscribing
friends and avoid paying CRAs.61 CRAs provide a public good by rating
debt, and in an investor-pays model, CRAs cannot avoid the free rider
problem once they publish their "opinions."62 On the other hand, in an
55. See Pinto, supra note 14, at 347 ("The default of $82 million in the market for
commercial paper of Penn Central in 1970 was a significant event for credit rating
agencies.").
56. Id.
57. See id. (stating that issuers turned to CRAs to rate their commercial paper in order
to calm the market).
58. See id. (stating that the increased use of CRAs by issuers "made it easier for them
to shift the costs from subscribers to issuers for the ratings" (citing Richard Cantor & Frank
Parker, The Credit Rating Industry, 19 FRBNY Q. REV. 1, 2 (Summer/Fall 1994), available
at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/quarterly_review/1994v19/v19n2article1.pdf)).
59. See Bruner & Abdelal, supra note 20, at 195 (stating that credit ratings "initially
were financed through subscription fees paid by investors").
60. See Pinto, supra note 14, at 347 ("Although [CRAs] were unable to anticipate the
problem, their increased use by issuers was clearly a boon to the agencies."); see also Bruner
& Abdelal, supra note 20, at 195 ("[T]he dominant rating agencies today derive their
revenues principally from issuer fees, creating an inherent conflict of interest that is only
exacerbated, according to the agencies’ critics, by the extension of the ratings franchise to
the provision of ancillary services."); Yair Listokin & Benjamin Taibleson, If You Misrate,
Then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating Accuracy Through Incentive Compensation, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 91, 96 (2010) ("A company pays a CRA to produce an informational public
good relating to the corporation—its credit rating.").
61. See White, supra note 27, at 214 ("First, the rating firms may have feared that their
sales of rating manuals would suffer from the consequences of the high-speed photocopy
machine . . . , which would allow too many investors to free ride by obtaining photocopies
from their friends.").
62. See Rousseau, supra note 2, at 45 ("Research on creditworthiness is similar to a
public good in that it is difficult to limit its accessibility by excluding those investors who
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issuer-pays model, the issuer can continue to pass costs on to investors even
after their debt has been rated.63 Second, following Penn Central’s
bankruptcy, issuers were willing to pay CRAs to assure bond investors that
their bonds were low risk.64 Third, regulatory uses of credit ratings
increased during the 1970s, and the opinions of certain recognized CRAs
became more valuable. As a result, issuers were willing to pay for the
blessing of certain CRAs.65
However, the issuer-pays model also opened the door to serious
conflicts of interest.66 In their defense, CRAs argue that concerns about
their reputations minimized these conflicts.67 Although CRAs are paid by
one or more of the parties to a transaction, their ratings should be neutral
because CRAs should be neutral, third-party advisors.68
CRAs also experienced significant growth and became more powerful
in the 1970s when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) coined
the term nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs).69
NRSROs are prominent CRAs that have been nationally recognized in the
United States as "issuers of ‘credible and reliable ratings by the
predominant users of securities ratings,’ permitting financial institutions to
have not paid for it."). In an investor-pays model, the general public would be deprived of
valuable information regarding creditworthiness because credit ratings would only be
available to subscribers. Id. at 46.
63. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 653 (1999) ("Although
investors are not paying directly for rating agencies to rate the securities they buy, issuers
who pay for ratings pass on the costs of those ratings to investors by paying a lower return
on debt issues.").
64. See id. at 652 (explaining that debt issuers were willing to pay CRAs to have the
CRAs vouch for their bonds).
65. Id.
66. See Rousseau, supra note 2, at 25 (explaining that CRAs may issue favorable
ratings in order to retain an issuer’s business). In addition, the structure of fees based on the
size of offerings might result in a conflict of interest. Id. For further information regarding
CRAs and conflicts of interest, see id. at 25–27.
67. See White, supra note 27, at 215 ("[T]he rating agencies’ concerns about their
long-run reputations apparently kept the actual conflicts in check . . . .").
68. See Joshua D. Krebs, The Rating Agencies: Where We Have Been and Where Do
We Go From Here?, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 133, 134 (2009) ("[Rating agencies]
claim they are merely reputational intermediaries sought by numerous market participants
for neutral opinions on the safety of securities products." (citing John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding Enron: "It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 BUS. LAW 1403, 1405
(2002)).
69. See Bruner & Abdelal, supra note 20, at 196 (stating that "the SEC coined the
concept of ‘nationally recognized statistical rating organizations’, [sic] or NRSROs, in
1975").
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count such ratings toward compliance with the wide range of regulations
incorporating the concept."70 In 1973, the SEC issued Rule 15c3-1,71 which
"allowed broker dealers to calculate their net capital requirements based on
credit ratings from a NRSRO designated by the [SEC]. Over time the
NRSRO concept was used in other contexts including both federal and state
legislation[] and in some markets."72 When Rule 15c3-1 was promulgated,
there were only three NRSROs—S&P, Moody’s Investors Service
(Moody’s), and Fitch Ratings Ltd. (Fitch).73 However, ten CRAs are
currently registered with the SEC as NRSROs.74 NRSROs occupy an
important place in banking, insurance, and other regulatory schemes.75
Some rules require certain investors to only buy highly rated bonds, and
other rules reduce capital requirements for entities that purchase highly
rated bonds.76
The increased regulatory uses of ratings have also stimulated the
demand for credit ratings.77 In the United States, regulations restrict or
70. Id. (quoting SEC, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 9 (2003)).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008).
72. Pinto, supra note 14, at 347. See id. at 347 nn.37–38 for examples of rules that
incorporate NRSRO ratings. CRAs are particularly important in the securitization market
because of various regulations requiring a rating. See id. at 347 n.39. Credit ratings were
first used in regulations in the 1930s. Id. at 346. Banking authorities passed a set of
regulations that "prohibited banks from investing in ‘speculative investment securities’ as
determined by ‘recognized rating manuals.’" White, supra note 27, at 213. This is also
when the investment grade concept developed. Id.
73. Pinto, supra note 14, at 347.
74. Krebs, supra note 68, at 135; see Ellsworth & Porapaiboon, supra note 10, at 1
("There are 10 credit rating agencies designated as [NRSROs] by the SEC: [Moody’s];
[S&P]; [Fitch]; A. M. Best Company; Dominion Bond Rating Service, Ltd.; Japan Credit
Rating Agency, Ltd.; R&I, Inc.; Egan-Jones Ratings Company; LACE Financial; and
Realpoint, LLC.").
75. Cf. Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 60, at 103 ("If ratings are untrustworthy, they
should not be placed at the heart of banking or insurance regulatory schemes.").
76. See Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An
Institutional Investor Perspective 4–5 (Council of Institutional Investors: The Voice of
Corporate Governance, Apr. 2009), available at www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CRAWhite
Paper04-14-09.pdf (explaining that NRSRO credit ratings are a necessary step for regulatory
compliance for all types of institutions). "For example, Rule 2a-7 under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 limits money market funds to investing in only high quality shortterm instruments, and NRSRO ratings are used as benchmarks for establishing minimum
quality investment standards." Pinto, supra note 14, at 347 n.37. Rule 3a-7 under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 exempted issues of some ABS from registration as a
mutual fund. LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 432. For additional examples of
regulatory uses of credit ratings in the United States, see id.
77. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 384 (stating that the growing use of

CREDIT RATING AGENCIES DESERVE CREDIT

1937

prohibit the purchase of securities with low credit ratings, impose capital
requirements depending on the holdings’ ratings, and affect disclosure
requirements for securities that possess "satisfactory" ratings.78 The main
purposes of such regulations are prudence, investor protection, and the
integrity of security markets.79 Prudential regulations aim to maintain
market confidence and stability by regulating capital and risk management
standards.80 Regulations also control market access by using ratings to
differentiate the due diligence and information requirements that an issuer
must satisfy before it can access the market.81 Additionally, regulations
protect the investor by establishing minimum rating standards to ensure
quality investments.82 The United States government mandate requiring the
use of credit ratings empowers CRAs while providing them with little
accountability.83
Until the mid-1970s, when the SEC began relying on CRAs for
regulatory purposes, CRAs survived "based on their ability to acquire and
retain reputational capital."84 Their success depended on trust and
credibility.85 Originally, CRAs did not have a governmental mandate.
If this view of the [CRAs] is correct, then credit ratings are simply
opinions, not unlike a restaurant star rating from Michelin. Credit
ratings respond to investors’ demand for information about risks
associated with fixed income investments. By specializing in the
gathering, analysis, examination, and dissemination of such information,
ratings for regulatory purposes has resulted in increased opportunity and importance for
CRAs).
78. See Bruner & Abdelal, supra note 20, at 192 ("Ratings are incorporated into
financial regulations in the United States, as well as in many other countries around the
world."); LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 431 (explaining the regulatory uses of
credit ratings).
79. LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 431.
80. See id. at 435 (stating that prudential regulations aim "to mitigate the possibility
that firms will be unable to meet their liabilities and commitments to consumers and
counterparties").
81. See id. at 436 ("Regulators also use credit ratings as an eligibility criterion for
issuers tapping the capital markets.").
82. See id. at 439 (providing examples of how financial regulation can be traced to
investor protection).
83. See Krebs, supra note 68, at 134 ("[CRAs] uniquely occupy a niche where
government regulation mandates that market participants utilize their ratings; they are, in
fact, selling compliance with official regulation." (citing Christopher M. Bruner, States,
Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory Regimes in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 125, 168 (2008))).
84. Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?, supra note 63, at 629.
85. Id.
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[CRAs] eliminate the duplicative and wasteful (i.e., inefficient) efforts
of individuals engaging in such activities. According to this view, credit
ratings are a competitive, reputation-driven business, and agencies will
survive only to the extent they are accurate and reliable in assessing the
86
credit risks of borrowers.

Three criteria are required before the reputational model can be effective.
First, CRAs must suffer a loss of future business if their ratings were
inaccurate.87 Second, the loss in reputational capital must exceed any gain
from inaccurate ratings.88 Third, CRAs must provide a costly service
related to the information gap between issuing firms and public investors.89
CRAs satisfy these three criteria.90 According to the reputational capital
view, CRAs "exist in a competitive market of information providers and
live or die based on their reputational capital."91 Consequently, a
heightened liability regime was not needed as much as it is today.92
After the 1970s, the reputational capital view was replaced by
regulatory licenses. The SEC incorporated credit ratings into various
regulations and, in a sense, awarded CRAs a government mandate.93 As a
result, the market became more concerned with whether a CRA had a
regulatory license and less worried about whether credit ratings were
accurate.94 The erosion of the reputational capital view has led to decreased
market accountability, and the federal government, particularly the SEC,
has not yet found a workable method through which it can hold CRAs
accountable.

86. Id. at 630–31 (citations omitted).
87. See id. at 633 ("[T]he certifying agent would suffer a loss of future relationships
because of reduced trustworthiness if it suggested a fair market value in excess of the
offering price.").
88. Id.
89. See id. ("Third, the agent’s services must be costly and the cost must be related to
the asymmetric information associated with the issuing firm." (citing Roger Stover, ThirdParty Certification in New Issues of Corporate Tax-Exempt Bonds: Standby Letter of Credit
and Bond Rating Information, 25 FIN. MGMT. 1, 63 (1996))).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 635.
92. Cf. id. at 646 (explaining that CRAs suffered during the 1940s and 1950s because
of their inability to generate accurate ratings after the 1930s).
93. See id. at 681 (stating that "a good rating entitles the issuer (and the investors in a
particular issue) to certain advantages related to regulation").
94. See id. at 681–82 (explaining the increased growth and increased importance of
rating agencies from the mid-1970s through today).
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E. Regulatory Licenses
As stated above, CRAs have benefited from valuable property rights
that are reinforced by regulations requiring credit ratings.95 "As legal
requirements for ratings have proliferated, the rating agencies have evolved
from information providers to purveyors of ‘regulatory licenses.’"96
Through these regulatory licenses, CRAs provide ratings that grant issuers
access to the financial markets.97 Regulatory licenses provide benefits to
NRSROs regardless of whether or not the ratings are credible and
accurate.98 "[O]nce the ratings of a small number of credit rating agencies
are enshrined by regulators who incorporate credit ratings into substantive
regulation, the markets become less vigilant about the agencies’
reputations."99
Issuers now pay CRAs to acquire licenses from
regulators,100 and consequently, NRSROs have a product to sell regardless
of their credibility.101 Regulatory licenses are costly because they create
oligopolistic pressures in a concentrated industry.102 Many argue that the
benefits of regulatory licenses need to be eliminated or reduced.103

95. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 60
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006) [hereinafter Other Gatekeepers] ("[T]he
most successful credit rating agencies have benefited from an oligopoly market structure that
is reinforced by regulations that depend exclusively on credit ratings issued by
[NRSROs].").
96. Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation, supra note 76, at 2.
97. See id. ("A regulatory license is a key that unlocks the financial markets. Credit
rating agencies profit from providing ratings that unlock access to the markets, regardless of
the accuracy of their ratings."). Good ratings entitle issuers to certain regulatory advantages.
Partnoy, Other Gatekeepers, supra note 95, at 82. Professor Partnoy argues that ratings are
not opinions but instead keys to the financial markets for regulated entities. Partnoy,
Overdependence, supra note 1, at 9.
98. See Partnoy, Other Gatekeepers, supra note 95, at 60 (stating that NRSROs
generate economic rents regardless of whether or not CRAs perform poorly and would
otherwise lose reputational capital).
99. Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Rating, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES, AND
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 73 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002).
100. See Partnoy, Other Gatekeepers, supra note 95, at 60–61 (stating that CRAs have
become more like "gate openers" than gatekeepers).
101. See id. (stating that regulatory licenses "generate economic rents for NRSROs that
persist even when they perform poorly and otherwise would lose reputational capital").
102. Id. at 83.
103. See id. at 89–90 (explaining proposals to reduce the benefits of regulatory
licenses).
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F. The Current Credit Rating Industry

Today, there are approximately 150 CRAs in 100 countries.104 CRAs
evaluate more than 745,000 securities, representing at least $30 trillion.105
Clearly, CRAs have the ability to influence the fixed income markets.
Although there are 150 CRAs globally, the market is dominated by
three main players: Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch.106 Together, Moody’s and
S&P control over 80% of all rated issues outstanding; Fitch, the third
largest CRA by market share, has a market share of 14%.107
The credit rating industry is vital to the effective operation of the
global financial markets.108 Because CRAs are central to capital formation,
investor confidence, and the United States economy, the activities of CRAs,
particularly NRSROs, are current matters of national public interest.109 The
transactions of CRAs "occur in such volume as substantially to affect
interstate commerce, the securities markets, the national banking system,
and the national economy."110 CRAs proved to be very influential in the
recent financial crisis and ensuing economic downturn.
104. LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 23.
105. Id. at 23.
106. Id. at 375.
107. Id. at 386.
108. See Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 2 ("Rating agencies profoundly impact the
ordering of global financial markets."). "[CRAs] are essential market participants."
Rousseau, supra note 2, at 27.
109. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010)
("Because of the systemic importance of credit . . . the activities and performances of credit
rating agencies, including [NRSROs], are matters of national public interest, as credit rating
agencies are central to capital formation, investor confidence, and the efficient performance
of the United States Economy."). On February 13, 1996, New York Times columnist
Thomas L. Friedman remarked: "There are two superpowers in the world today in my
opinion. There’s the United States, and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United
States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading
your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who’s more powerful." White, supra
note 27, at 216 (quoting Interview with Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times columnist, in
a PBS "News Hour" interview (Feb. 13, 1996)).
110. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 2, 120 Stat.
1327, 1327. Since the 1970s, CRAs developed a significant global presence as more and
more sovereign governments issued debt. Bruner & Abdelal, supra note 20, at 194. "The
[CRAs’] sovereign ratings indirectly affect every other bond rating in the world because of
the so-called ‘sovereign ceiling.’" Id. at 192. A sovereign’s local currency ratings are
typically higher than its foreign currency ratings because a sovereign’s capacity to repay
local currency debt can be controlled through taxation and monetary policy. Bruner, supra
note 83, at 135. With regard to foreign currency debts, sovereigns have less flexibility
because they must acquire the foreign currency in the marketplace before repaying debt. Id.
(citations omitted). "The primacy of a sovereign’s claim on available foreign currency
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III. The Role of CRAs in the Financial Crisis
CRAs have been criticized for their role in the recent financial crisis.111
Investors and banks lost hundreds of billions of dollars because of
misguided confidence in mortgage-backed securities, particularly subprime
securities.112 Beginning in the late 1990s, issuers packaged residential
mortgages into MBSs and CDOs.113 The sales of these bonds were used to
finance the tremendous United States housing bubble that began in the late
1990s and continued through mid-2006.114 The underlying financing for
these loans was possible through a process of securitization.115
The technique of securitization can be summarized as follows. A
corporation (the "originator") seeks to raise funds using revenue
generating assets that it owns. After having identified such assets, the
originator transfers them to [a] special purpose vehicle ("SPV") through
a sale. Transferring the assets is meant to shield those assets from risks
related to the originator. To pay for the assets, the SPV issues debt-like
securities in the capital markets. The cash flows generated by the assets
are used to make monthly [interest] and principal payments to investors
holding the securities. . . . As a result of securitization, the receivables
transferred to the SPV are transformed into capital market
116
instruments.

Issuers divided the risk of default for mortgage-related securities into
different tranches, which would be assigned different ratings.117 The junior

results in the so-called ‘sovereign ceiling’ . . . effect—the general trend (though not
universal rule) that sub-sovereign entities within a given country will have lower foreign
currency ratings than the sovereign." Id. at 135–36 (citations omitted). Accordingly,
sovereigns seek foreign currency ratings, even in the absence of debt issuances, in order to
"gain ‘stamps of approval’ from international capital markets" and to facilitate access for
major sub-sovereign entities. Bruner & Abdelal, supra note 20, at 195 (citations omitted).
111. Alessi & Wolverson, supra note 35.
112. Ellsworth & Porapaiboon, supra note 10, at 1.
113. Krebs, supra note 68, at 137–38.
114. See White, supra note 27, at 212 ("The sales of [securities based on subprime
residential mortgages and other debt obligations] . . . were an important underpinning for the
financing of the self-reinforcing price-rise bubble in the U.S. housing market.").
115. Id. at 220.
116. Rousseau, supra note 2, at 6.
117. See White, supra note 27, at 220 ("The subprime mortgage loans were combined
into mortgage-related securities, which in turn were divided into a number of more-senior
and less-senior tranches, such that junior tranches would bear all losses before the senior
tranches bore any.").
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tranches would bear all losses before the senior tranches incurred any
losses.118
Issuers increased profitability through this process and facilitated the
market meltdown.119 CRAs evaluated and produced ratings for securitized
loan pools and other collateralized debt obligations, which were at the heart
of the financial crisis.120 Favorable ratings from CRAs were crucial to the
success of the securitization of subprime mortgages.121 Credit ratings had
the force of law with respect to MBSs and CDOs.122 CRAs also established
favorable reputations in the corporate and government bond markets, which
resulted in a misguided level of trust in MBS ratings by bond purchasers.123
In the markets for structured products, CRAs did much more than
eliminate information asymmetries.124 Structured products developed
because of quality assurances provided by CRAs about complex financial
products.125 CRAs were very involved in the design and structure of MBSs
and CDOs.126 In contrast to the corporate and government bond context,
CRAs consulted extensively with issuers and instructed issuers on how to
earn higher ratings for various tranches of MBSs and CDOs.127 In doing so,
they trained issuers to be more profitable; many issuers changed their
practices over time to please credit analysts so that they could earn higher
118. Id.
119. See Krebs, supra note 68, at 137–38 (explaining how issuers maximized profit
with regard to MBSs and CDOs).
120. See Ellsworth & Porapaiboon, supra note 10 (explaining that CRAs produced
ratings for many of the subprime securities at the heart of the financial crisis); Krebs, supra
note 68, at 137–38 (stating that MBS and CDOs were two of the many financial instruments
that CRAs covered).
121. See White, supra note 27, at 220 ("The securitization of these subprime mortgages
was only able to succeed—that is, the resulting securities were only able to be widely
marketed and sold—because of the favorable ratings bestowed on the more-senior
tranches.").
122. See id. (stating that "credit ratings had the force of law with respect to regulated
financial institutions’ abilities and incentives (via capital requirements) to invest in these
bonds").
123. See id. (stating that CRAs had developed favorable reputations through their
corporate and government bond ratings).
124. Utzig, supra note 1, at 1.
125. See id. ("Markets for structured products could not have developed without the
quality assurance provided by CRAs to unsophisticated investors about inherently complex
financial products.").
126. See White, supra note 27, at 220 (stating that CRAs were much more involved in
the design of mortgage-related securities than the rating of bonds issued by corporations and
government agencies).
127. Id. at 220–21.
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ratings.128 Additionally, CRAs were more likely to cater to issuers in the
structured finance products context than in the corporate and government
debt context because there were far fewer issuers of structured finance
products and much higher profit margins.129 CRAs earned as much as three
times more revenue for rating complex MBSs and CDOs as they did from
rating corporate debt.130
Although CRAs were once considered trusted gatekeepers, many of
the ratings that they assigned to MBSs and CDOs were inaccurate.131
Ratings for structured products turned out to be more unreliable than ratings
for plain vanilla corporate and government bonds.132 CRAs did not perform
proper due diligence or verify the accuracy of information provided to them
regarding mortgages underlying the MBS pools they rated.133 Furthermore,
many question the methodologies and assumptions CRAs relied on to rate
MBSs.134 CRAs relied on models that did not account for all the risk
dimensions of these structured products.135 CRAs used unreasonable and
128. See id. (stating that CRAs would offer extensive advice to issuers of MBSs and
CDOs on what kinds of mortgages would earn what ratings).
129. See id. at 221 ("Unlike the market for rating corporate and government debt, where
there were thousands of issuers, the market for rating mortgage-related securities involved
only a relatively small number of investment banks as securitizers with high volumes; and
the profit margins on these mortgage-related securities were substantially larger as well.").
An investment bank that was unhappy with an agency’s ratings "had a more powerful
threat—to move all of its securitization business to a different [CRA]—than would any
individual corporate or government issuer." Id.
130. Elliot Blair Smith, Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime
Scourge, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=ah
839IWTLP9s&pid=newsarchive (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
131. Krebs, supra note 68, at 137–38.
132. See Utzig, supra note 1, at 1 ("[T]he ratings for structured credit turned out to be
much less robust predictors of future developments than were the ratings for traditional
single name securities.").
133. See Rousseau, supra note 2, at 23 ("CRAs ‘did not engage in any due diligence or
otherwise seek to verify the accuracy or quality of the loan data underlying the RMBS pools
they rated.’").
134. See Michel G. Crouhy, Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, The Subprime
Credit Crisis of 2007, 16 J. DERIVATIVES 81, 95–97 (2008) (explaining the rating
methodology and summarizing factors that contributed to the crisis).
135. See id. (describing the models used to rate MBSs); see also Alessi & Wolverson,
supra note 35 (stating that CRAs created "complex models to calculate the probability of
default for individual mortgages and also for the securitized products these mortgages made
up"). "Raters deemed many of these so-called ‘structured’ products top-tier triple-A material
for several years during the housing boom, only to downgrade them to below investment
grade when the housing market collapsed." Id.
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inaccurate assumptions in order to complete more deals and generate
greater revenue.136 CRAs used outdated historical assumptions concerning
the underlying mortgages in MBSs and CDOs.137 The inputs for these
models included expected default rate, recovery rate, and the correlation of
expected defaults.138 Models, which are representations of reality, will not
work if market conditions drastically change.139 Raters failed to judge the
probability of the decline in housing prices, and they did not account for the
systemic risks associated with downgrading structured products.140
Downgrading structured products is more significant than downgrading
vanilla bonds because structured products are connected to numerous
financial securities.141 In rating securities backed by mortgages, "the credit
rating agencies were operating in a situation where they had essentially no
prior experience, where they were intimately involved in the design of the
securities, and where they were under considerable financial pressure to
give the answers that issuers wanted to hear."142 In addition, CRAs
probably were not too concerned about their reputations because the
industry is essentially an oligopoly.143
As stated earlier, the ratings for MBSs and CDOs proved to be
extremely optimistic.144 In 2006, housing prices began to decline, and
default rates on the mortgages underlying many MBSs and CDOs increased
drastically.145 Nevertheless, CRAs failed to immediately downgrade those
136. Partnoy, Overdependence, supra note 1, at 6.
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id.
139. See Hershey H. Friedman & Linda Weiser Friedman, The Global Financial Crisis
of 2008: What Went Wrong?, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 35 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2010) (stating that
models do not work in periods of extreme market turbulence).
140. See Alessi & Wolverson, supra note 35 (stating that the CRAs failed to judge the
likelihood of a decline in housing prices and the subsequent effect on defaults).
141. See id. ("The negative impact of downgrading a structured product is greater than
downgrading a sovereign bond, since structured products are intricately connected to many
other securities in the financial system, rather than just one loan.").
142. White, supra note 27, at 221.
143. See id. ("[I]t is not surprising that the members of a tight, protected oligopoly
might become complacent and less worried about the problems of protecting their long-run
reputations.").
144. See id. (explaining that securities issued and rated in 2005–2007 were particularly
optimistic).
145. See id. at 212 (stating that initial credit ratings proved to be too optimistic in mid2006). Although the rating agencies began warning investors about the housing market as
early as 2005, CRAs did not "appropriately measure[] the sensitivity of losses to economic
activity or anticipate[] the severity of the downturn." LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6,
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securities as losses materialized, which further escalated the crisis.146 The
instability and inaccuracy of ratings was a major contributor to the recent
financial crisis. It became clear that trusting a credit rating was a poor
investment strategy and a dangerous way to issue debt.147 In addition, it
"became clear that most of the participants in the financial markets had little
idea of what [CRAs] really do, why they do it, and what to expect from
them."148
IV. CRA Liability Before the Dodd-Frank Act
Until recently, CRAs were completely unregulated.149 In 2006,
Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (CRARA), which
attempted to increase accountability, transparency, and competition in the
CRA industry.150 However, CRARA was unsuccessful, as it actually
shielded CRAs from securities law liability and proscribed SEC regulation
at 365–67.
146. See White, supra note 27, at 221 ("As of June 30, 2009, 90 percent of the
collateralized debt obligation tranches that were issued between 2005 and 2007 and that
were originally rated AAA by [S&P] had been downgraded, with 80 percent downgraded
below investment grade . . . .").
147. See Santomero, supra note 31, at viii ("It soon became clear that blindly following
a credit rating agency grade was an ill-conceived investment strategy, an ill-conceived way
to issue debt, and an ill-conceived way to regulate institutions and their capital market
investments."). CRAs lost credibility because of their negligence and mistakes. "The most
evident trigger of this loss of credibility occurred during the second week of July 2007 when
S&P downgraded $7.3 billion of securities issued in 2005 and 2006 and a few weeks later,
Moody’s downgraded 691 securities of the 2006 vintage, originally worth $19.4 billion."
LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 364. "This torrent of downgrades precipitated a
major government review of the credit-rating agencies. As one Moody’s executive said in
an internal memo about these downgrades: ‘These downgrades make us look either
incompetent at credit analysis, or like we sold our soul to the devil for revenue.’" ROBERT
POZEN, TOO BIG TO SAVE? HOW TO FIX THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 60 (2010) (citing Credit
Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Congressional Hearings by Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform (Oct. 22, 2008) (statement of Henry A. Waxman, Chairman)).
148. Santomero, supra note 31, at viii.
149. See Scott McCleskey, The Scott McCleskey Report: The Next Unintended
Consequence—An Unregulated U.S. Credit Rating Industry?, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://www.complinet.com/dodd-frank/news/analysis/article/the-scott-mccleskey-report-henext-unintended-consequence-an-unregulated-credit-rating-industry.html (last visited Nov.
29, 2011) ("[U]ntil Congress passed a law regulating [CRAs] in 2006 (only implemented in
late 2007), there were virtually no regulatory requirements imposed on NRSROs and their
activities.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
150. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327, 1327 (stating the purpose of the Act).
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of the substance of ratings.151 Consequently, lawsuits by private parties
against CRAs generally have been unsuccessful,152 and CRAs have been
able to escape liability for their poor ratings.153
For decades, CRAs have been successful in arguing for legal
immunity. CRAs assert that credit ratings are expressions of free speech,
and as a result, their publishers—the CRAs—should be afforded protection
under the First Amendment.154
In addition, CRAs include broad
disclaimers in their ratings and advise investors not to rely on their
ratings.155 These arguments have proven successful in the past, and as a
result, CRAs were basically exempt from legal liability prior to the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.156
The [SEC] ha[d] relieved NRSROs from the accountability that would
otherwise apply under the federal securities laws: it ha[d] exempted
NRSROs from expert liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act if
their ratings appear in a prospectus for a public offering of a security
registered under that Act. As a result, issuers d[id] not have to obtain
consents from NRSROs before publishing their ratings and NRSROs
[were] exempt from Section 11 liability if their ratings [were] included
in a registration statement. The exemption of NRSROs from the normal
liability provisions of Section 11 of the Securities Act mean[t] that
NRSROs [were] not held to a negligence standard of care. The rating
agencies also maintain that they are members of the "media" that are

151. Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & Chris Sagers, Credit Rating Organizations, Their Role
in the Current Calamity, and Future Prospects for Reform, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 379 (Robert W. Kolb ed.,
2010).
152. See id. (stating that "U.S. courts have held that the [CRAs] are protected by the
free speech protections of the First Amendment, so regulation of or litigation against the
CROs for their ratings might be unconstitutional.").
153. See id. at 381 (stating that CRAs enjoyed substantial legal protections prior to the
Dodd-Frank Act).
154. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 182 (stating that ratings are opinions
on matters of public concern, not statements of fact or investment recommendations (quoting
J.M. Dering, Executive Vice President for Global Regulatory Affairs and Compliance for
Moody’s Corp., Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute 5 (Sept. 27, 2005))).
155. POZEN, supra note 147, at 64.
156. LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 182; see also POZEN, supra note 147, at 64
(stating that CRAs have avoided liability in the past because of the First Amendment and
broad disclaimers in their ratings). For examples of cases, see Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No.
R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Serv., Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Enron Corp. Sec.
Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Cnty. of Orange v.
McGraw Hill Co., 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999); First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard &
Poor’s Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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providing their "opinions," and thus claim that they can only be liable if
157
their conduct can be said to have been "reckless."

Former Rule 436(g),158 which was promulgated under the Securities
Act, exempted NRSROs from certain liability under the Securities Act.159
Rule 436(g) provided that credit ratings assigned to a class of debt
securities, convertible debt securities, or preferred stock by a NRSRO
would not be considered "part of a registration statement prepared or
certified by a person within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the
[Securities] Act."160 Section 7 provides that registrants of a registration
statement must file written consent of experts, who prepare or certify any
part of the registration statement.161 Section 11 exposes certain people to
civil liability if the registration statement misrepresents a material fact or
omits to state a material fact.162 Thus, liability could not be imposed on
157. LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 6, at 182 (quoting SEC Hearing on Issues
Relating to Credit Rating Agencies, Nov. 21, 2002, § 3, Point 4 (2002) (statement of Amy
Lancelotta, Senior Counsel of Investment Company Institute)).
158. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436 (2011).
159. See SEC, Fact Sheet: Strengthening Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies (Sept.
17, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-200-factsheet.htm (last visited Nov.
29, 2011) (stating that Rule 436(g) exempted NRSROs from certain liability and was
adopted to facilitate voluntary disclosure of ratings in registration statements) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). NRSROs have also avoided certain liability because
they are excluded from the definition of "investment adviser." See Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Repeal of Credit Ratings Agency Exemption from Regulation FD (Oct. 11,
2010),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/RepealOfCreditRatingsAgency
ExemptionFromRegFD.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) ("The Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act also amended Section 2(a)(11)(F) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 so
that NRSROs are specifically excluded from the definition of ‘investment adviser’ . . . .")
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
160. International Law Office, Dodd-Frank Act: Elimination of Rating Agency
Protections (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?
g=6955b391-ee87-41a4-84d4-f7f356cad724 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Former Rule 436(g) provided in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) and (b) of this section, the
security rating assigned to a class of debt securities, a class of convertible debt
securities or a class of preferred stock by a nationally recognized statistical
rating organization, . . . shall not be considered part of a registration statement
prepared or certified by a person within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the
Act.
17 C.F.R. § 230.436 (2011).
161. See International Law Office, supra note 160 ("Section 7 provides that when
certain experts are named as having prepared or certified ‘any part’ of the registration
statement, the registrant must file the written consent of such person with the registration
statement.").
162. See id. ("Section 11 imposes civil liability on specified classes of person in the
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NRSROs for any credit rating information in a registration statement.163
Issuers could include rating information in their public statements without
obtaining the consent of CRAs.164
V. Credit Rating Agencies and the Dodd-Frank Act
A. Background and Findings
The Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, in part, to prevent another
financial crisis165 and "[t]o promote the financial stability of the United
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system."166 CRAs facilitated the recent financial crisis and, as a result,
reform of the CRA industry is necessary to promote financial stability and
prevent future crises. The Dodd-Frank Act addresses the following topics
with regard to CRAs: increased accountability, conflicts of interest and
ratings accuracy, reliance on ratings by federal agencies, and public
disclosure of rating methodologies.167 The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to
event that any part of the registration statement contains an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading."). Section 11(a)(4) permits any person acquiring a
security that contains an untrue statement of material fact or omits to state a material fact to
sue
every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives
authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having
prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with
the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registration
statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified
by him.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (2006).
163. See International Law Office, supra note 160 (explaining the effect of former Rule
436(g)).
164. Id.
165. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform: Conference Report Summary of H.R. Rep.
No. 111-517, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter Brief Summary], available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_compreh
ensive_summary_Final.pdf (stating the major goals of the Dodd-Frank Act).
166. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
167. See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act:
Credit Rating Agency Provisions (July 15, 2010),
http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/2829.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (listing the topics
related to CRAs that the Dodd-Frank Act covers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). "The Act seeks to impose corporate governance guidelines, reduce conflicts of
interest, and improve the rating process through enhanced controls and greater
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increase SEC oversight of CRAs and make it easier for investors to sue
CRAs.168
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress found that CRAs are "matters of
national public interest" because of the systemic importance of credit
ratings.169 CRAs play a gatekeeper role in the debt market and are often
compared to securities analysts, who are the gatekeepers of the equity
market, and auditors, who review the financial statements of firms.170
Congress found that "[b]ecause [CRAs] perform evaluative and analytical
services on behalf of clients, much as other financial ‘gatekeepers’ do, the
activities of [CRAs] are fundamentally commercial in character and should
be subject to the same standards of liability and oversight as apply to
auditors, securities analysts, and investment bankers."171 Furthermore,
Congress found that inaccurate ratings of structured financial products in
the recent financial crisis require increased accountability on the part of
CRAs.172
B. Summary of Provisions Related to CRAs
The goal of Subtitle C of the Dodd-Frank Act is to enhance regulation,
accountability, and transparency of NRSROs.173 The Dodd-Frank Act
establishes an Office of Credit Ratings at the SEC that will oversee
NRSROs and administer SEC rules with respect to NRSRO credit rating
practices.174 In addition, Subtitle C of the Dodd-Frank Act requires
transparency." Gregory A. Fernicola & Joshua B. Goldstein, Credit Rating Agencies:
Skadden Commentary on the Dodd-Frank Act (July 9, 2010), http://www.
skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=2135 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
168. Fernicola & Goldstein, supra note 167.
169. See Dodd-Frank Act § 931(1), 124 Stat. at 1872 ("[T]he activities and
performances of credit rating agencies, including [NRSROs], are matters of national public
interest, as [CRAs] are central to capital formation, investor confidence, and the efficient
performance of the United States economy.").
170. See id. (explaining that CRAs are gatekeepers similar to securities analysts and
auditors).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1, 124 Stat. at 1381–82 (listing the names of Subtitle C—
Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Ratings Agencies—and § 932—Enhanced
Regulation, Accountability, and Transparency of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations).
174. See id. § 932(a)(5) (stating that "[t]he Commission shall establish within the
Commission an Office of Credit Ratings . . . to administer the rules of the Commission");
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NRSROs to make various disclosures regarding CRA methodologies, due
diligence, and ratings track records.175 NRSROs must disclose the
procedures and methodologies that they use in their ratings, including
qualitative and quantitative models.176 NRSROs must provide the SEC
with information regarding the reliability, accuracy, and quality of
information, including information from third parties, used in the issuance
of ratings.177 The Act also requires CRAs to consider credible information
from outside sources in their ratings.178
Subtitle C also addresses the serious conflicts of interest problems
associated with the CRA industry, specifically with the current issuer-pays
system.179 Section 932 requires each NRSRO to establish internal controls
that will implement, enforce, and maintain credit rating policies,
procedures, and methodologies.180 It requires each NRSRO to have a Board
of Directors, at least half of whom are independent of the NRSRO.181
Additionally, Section 932
[p]rohibits compliance officers from working on ratings, methodologies,
or sales; installs a new requirement for NRSROs to conduct a one-year
look-back review when an NRSRO employee goes to work for an
Brief Summary, supra note 165, at 10 ("[The Dodd-Frank Act] [c]reates an Office of Credit
Ratings at the SEC with expertise and its own compliance staff and the authority to fine
agencies. The SEC is required to examine [NRSROs] at least once a year and make key
findings public."). The Office of Credit Ratings is designed to promote accuracy in NRSRO
credit ratings and to ensure that such ratings are not influenced by conflicts of interest.
Dodd-Frank Act § 932(a)(5), 124 Stat. at 1877.
175. Brief Summary, supra note 165, at 10.
176. See Dodd-Frank Act § 932(a)(5), 124 Stat. at 1879 (stating that the SEC shall
prescribe rules with respect to credit rating methodologies).
177. Id. § 932(a), 124 Stat. at 1879–82. Section 935 of the Act requires NRSROs, in
producing credit ratings, to "consider information about an issuer that the [NRSRO] has, or
receives from a source other than the issuer or underwriter, that the [NRSRO] finds credible
and potentially significant to a rating decision." Id. § 935.
178. See Brief Summary, supra note 165, at 10 (stating that the Dodd-Frank Act
requires "agencies to consider information in their ratings that comes to their attention from
a source other than the organizations being rated if they find it credible").
179. See id. ("[The Dodd-Frank Act] [r]educes over-reliance on ratings and encourages
investors to conduct their own analysis.").
180. See Dodd-Frank Act § 932(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1873 ("Each [NRSRO] shall
establish, maintain, enforce, and document an effective internal control structure governing
the implementation of and adherence to policies, procedures, and methodologies for
determining credit ratings, taking into consideration such factors as the [SEC] may prescribe,
by rule."). Although Section 932 requires each NRSRO to establish an internal control
structure, it does not eliminate the conflict of interest problem associated with the issuerpays model.
181. Id. § 932(a)(5), 124 Stat. at 1882.
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obligor or underwriter of a security or money market instrument subject
to a rating by that NRSRO; and mandates that a [NRSRO] report to the
SEC when certain employees of the NRSRO go to work for an entity
182
that the NRSRO has rated in the previous twelve months.

In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act prevents ratings shopping183 and
requires that NRSRO employees are trained properly and tested on their
knowledge of the credit rating process.184 Furthermore, the Act reduces
over-reliance on credit ratings;185 however, it does not eliminate regulatory
uses of credit ratings.186 These newly adopted regulations and policies are
intended to increase transparency, mitigate conflicts of interest, and protect
investors.
In accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC recently has
proposed amendments that would remove references to credit ratings in
rules and forms promulgated under the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act.187 The focus of the proposal is to remove the use of credit ratings as a
prerequisite for companies using short-form registration when selling

182. Brief Summary, supra note 165, at 10.
183. See id. at 11 ("The SEC shall create a new mechanism to prevent issuers of asset
backed-securities from picking the agency they think will give the highest rating, after
conducting a study and after submission of the report to Congress.").
184. Dodd-Frank Act § 936(a), 124 Stat. at 1884–85.
185. See id. ("[The Act] reduces over-reliance on ratings and encourages investors to
conduct their own analysis.").
186. See id. §§ 939–939A, 124 Stat. at 1885–87 (stating that references to credit ratings
should be removed from various statutory references and all federal agencies should review
regulations referencing credit ratings and replace the references to credit ratings with a
different standard of creditworthiness). Thus, although the regulatory requirement of
reliance on credit ratings is abolished, the agencies must implement a new standard of
creditworthiness for such regulations. Id. § 939A, 124 Stat. at 1887. "Section 939A of the
[Dodd-Frank Act] requires federal agencies to review how existing regulations rely on credit
ratings and remove such references from their rules as appropriate." SEC, SEC Proposes
First in Series of Rule Amendments to Remove References to Credit Ratings (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-41.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The reduction of regulatory uses of credit ratings
will be a slow and arduous process. John C. Coffee Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly 43 (Columbia Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 359, Sept. 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ ol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650802. Credit ratings are
embedded in the debt offering process, and as a result, they cannot be eliminated from
regulation instantaneously. See id. at 45 ("The message here is that reform needs to be
incremental, because ratings are too deeply embedded in the debt offering process to be
simply eliminated by the stroke of a pen.").
187. SEC, SEC Proposes First in Series of Rule Amendments to Remove References to
Credit Ratings, supra note 186.
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securities to the public.188 According to the proposal, a new test that
evaluates the amount of debt and non-convertible securities the registering
company has sold in the past three years will be used instead of ratings.189
If the SEC determines that the proposal is appropriate, it will limit the
regulatory uses of credit ratings.
C. Provisions that Affect CRA Liability
Although Subtitle C addresses many aspects of CRA regulation, this
Note focuses on CRA liability after the Dodd-Frank Act. As stated earlier,
CRAs have successfully avoided liability for inaccurate ratings because of
various defenses and regulatory exemptions.190 The Dodd-Frank Act
attempts to eliminate CRA immunity by providing for additional penalties
and potential liabilities for NRSROs. Section 932 also grants the SEC the
power to suspend or permanently revoke an NRSRO’s registration with
respect to certain securities if the SEC determines that the NRSRO has
provided unreliable ratings over time.191
Several sections of the Dodd-Frank Act also address the potential
liability defenses of NRSROs.192 The Dodd-Frank Act states that the
Exchange Act provisions that prohibit the regulation of the substance of a
rating can no longer be used as a defense to CRA liability.193 Furthermore,
188. Id.
189. See Pamela A. Meredith, SEC Proposes Rule Amendments To Remove Credit
Ratings References, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.ballardspahr.com/
xml/~/link.aspx?_id=1E68919DC19C4067ACC146D2A5FD89BE&_z=z (last visited Nov.
29, 2011) ("[The new requirement] would permit use of a short-form registration statement
for primary offerings of non-convertible securities if the issuer has issued . . . more than $1
billion in non-convertible securities, other than common equity, through registered primary
offerings over the last three years and otherwise meets the registrant requirements.") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
190. See supra Part VII (explaining why CRAs avoided liability before the enactment
of the Dodd-Frank Act).
191. See Dodd-Frank Act § 932(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 1874 ("The [SEC] may temporarily
suspend or permanently revoke the registration of a [NRSRO] with respect to a particular
class or subclass of securities, if the [SEC] finds . . . that the [NRSRO] does not have
adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently produce credit ratings with
integrity.").
192. Thomas O. Gorman, Dodd-Frank Impact on Credit Rating Agencies, LEXISNEXIS
CORPORATE AND SECURITY LAW COMMUNITY (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.lexisnexis.
com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporateandsecuritieslawblog/archive/2010/08/24/doddfrank-impact-on-credit-rating-agencies.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
193. See id. ("The Exchange Act provisions which prohibit the regulation of the
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the Dodd-Frank Act increases CRA accountability by amending Section
15(m) of the Exchange Act to read as follows:
(1) In General—The enforcement and penalty provisions of this title
shall apply to statements made by a credit rating agency in the same
manner and to the same extent as such provisions apply to statements
made by a registered public accounting firm or a securities analyst under
the securities laws, and such statements shall not be deemed forward194
looking statements for the purposes of section 21E.

Thus, CRAs will be held accountable for their statements to the same extent
as other "gatekeepers," namely, accountants and securities analysts.195
Section 933 of the Dodd-Frank Act also alters the pleading standards
for lawsuits against CRAs.196 Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act, a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff had to plead that the CRA did not believe its
credit ratings or that the ratings lacked a factual basis in order to survive a
motion to dismiss.197 This was a heavy pleading burden.198 Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, investors, for purposes of pleading the required state of
mind in a private right of action for damages against CRAs, must only set
forth facts supporting an inference that the CRA knowingly or recklessly
failed: (i) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts it relied on in
its credit rating; or (ii) to obtain verification from other independent
sources.199 If a CRA does not conduct its own reasonable investigation or
rely on the due diligence of an independent firm, a plaintiff who provides
factual pleadings of this failure will survive a motion to dismiss.200
substance of a rating are not a defense to antifraud liability.").
194. Dodd-Frank Act § 933(a), 124 Stat. at 1883.
195. See American Bankers Association, 9.10 Improvements to the Regulation of Credit
Rating Agencies, http://www.aba.com/RegReform/RR9_10.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2011)
("Enforcement and penalty provisions now apply to statements made by a [CRA] in the same
manner and extent as statements made by registered public accountants or securities law
analysts.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
196. See Dodd-Frank Act § 933(b), 124 Stat. at 1883–84 (addressing the scienter
requirements for pleading an anti-fraud action against CRAs). This pleading standard is
presumably for anti-fraud actions based on Rule 10b-5. Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note
186, at 46.
197. See Fernicola & Goldstein, supra note 167 ("In the context of credit ratings, courts
required plaintiffs to plead that the rating agency did not genuinely believe its opinions
regarding credit quality or that the opinions lacked basis in fact." (citing In re IBM Corp.
Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1998))).
198. Id.
199. See Dodd-Frank Act § 933(b), 124 Stat. at 1883 (explaining the state of mind
required in private actions).
200. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 46–47 (explaining the practical

1954

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1925 (2011)

Nevertheless, the plaintiff will still have to show other elements of a Rule
10b-5 cause of action, including loss causation and reliance.201
In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act repeals Rule 436(g), which exempted
CRAs from being considered as part of a registration statement, and
subjects NRSROs to expert liability under Section 11 of the Securities
Act.202 As stated earlier, Rule 436(g) provided that NRSRO credit ratings
are not considered part of a registration statement.203 The Dodd-Frank Act
requires registrants to obtain written consent of an NRSRO before it
includes a credit rating in a registration statement.204 Furthermore,
NRSROs may be liable under Section 11 of the Exchange Act if they
provide a registrant consent to name them as having prepared or certified a
registration statement or valuations used in connection with the
statement.205 In defending a Section 11 claim, CRAs will be required to
show that they reasonably believed that the credit rating was accurate.206
The United States Congress believes that CRAs do provide valuable
information that influences the cost of capital, particularly with regard to
complex debt securities.207 Traditionally, the United States has relied on
private enforcement and litigation to dissuade wrongdoing in the financial
system.208 The Dodd-Frank Act is necessary to continue this tradition and
effect of the "State of Mind in Private Actions" pleading standard in Section 933).
201. Id.
202. See Brief Summary, supra note 165, at 10 ("NRSROs will now be subject to
‘expert liability’ with the nullification of Rule 436(g) which provides an exemption for
credit ratings provided by NRSROs from being considered a part of the registration
statement."). Expert liability is not a different type of liability; however, experts have a
tougher time asserting due diligence defenses to liability.
203. See supra Part IV (describing former Rule 436(g)).
204. See Orrick, supra note 167 ("Written consent of an NRSRO must thus be obtained
by a registrant in order to include a credit rating in a registration statement, and NRSROs are
therefore subject to liability under Section 11 of the [1933] Act for misstatements or
omissions of material facts in connection with credit rating disclosure.").
205. See Fernicola & Goldstein, supra note 166 (explaining that CRAs could be
exposed to expert liability if they consent to the inclusion of a credit rating in a registration
statement).
206. See id. ("In order to defend against a Section 11 claim, a rating agency would be
required to show that it had reasonable grounds to believe, and did in fact believe, that the
included credit rating was accurate.").
207. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 5–6 (explaining that Congress
believes that "in the case of complex and opaque debt securities (such as [CDOs]), ‘do-ityourself’ credit analysis, even by relatively sophisticated institutional investors, is no more
feasible than ‘do-it-yourself’ brain surgery").
208. See id. at 6 (explaining the difference between European and U.S. institutional
culture and regulatory options).
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increase CRA accountability because alternatives to the current CRA model
seem impractical.209
VI. Alternatives to the Current CRA Model
Although financial regulators outsourced the duty to judge credit risk
to the CRAs, many policymakers and experts are evaluating various
alternatives to the current CRA model because of the CRAs’ failure to
adequately assess risk before the financial crisis.210 A credit rating is only
one method of assessing credit risk.211 However, finding alternative
standards of creditworthiness is more difficult than initially thought.212
One alternative is to replace the issuer-pays model with an investorpays model.213 Proponents of this proposal believe it will eliminate
conflicts of interest and lead to more accurate ratings.214 However, a
change to an investor-pays model is probably infeasible. Credit ratings are
a "public good in that it is difficult to limit [their] accessibility by excluding
those investors who have not paid for [them]."215 This free rider problem
209. See Fernicola & Goldstein, supra note 167 ("[T]he Act will greatly expand the
SEC’s oversight and enforcement powers and seeks to make it easier for investors to bring
civil lawsuits against rating agencies."); see also Colin Barr, Gross Rips the Rating
Agencies, CNNMONEY (May 5, 2010), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/05/05/grossrips-the-rating-agencies/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (stating that it is difficult to develop a
workable alternative to CRAs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
210. See Ben Protess, S.E.C. Seeks to Reduce Reliance on Credit Reliance, DEALBOOK
(Feb. 9, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/s-e-c-aims-to-reduce-reliance-onratings/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) ("Rather than judge the safety of corporate bonds and
other investments, regulators outsource that duty to the rating agencies.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
211. See Utzig, supra note 1, at 18 (explaining that there are other ways to implement
the service provided by CRAs and a credit rating is only one method of analyzing credit
risk).
212. See Edward Wyatt, Fed Chief Says U.S. Bolstered Its Ability to Handle Failure of
a Big Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, at B3 ("[A]fter significant study and comment, we
have found no practical alternative for [credit] ratings that could be used across the banking
sector." (quoting John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency)).
213. See Rousseau, supra note 2, at 45 ("Given that [the issuer-pays] model is the
source of serious criticism, commentators have advocated doing away with it and proposed
‘to restore the principal-agent relationship that once existed by requiring rating agencies to
be paid by the users of their information, not the issuer.’" (quoting J.C. COFFEE,
GATEKEEPERS—THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 298 (2006))).
214. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 30–31 (stating that the issuer-pays
model undercuts the independence and objectivity of CRAs).
215. Rousseau, supra note 2, at 45.
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will threaten the profitability and sustainability of CRAs because CRAs will
be unable to realize the full value of the financial information they
provide.216 Furthermore, an investor-pays model will deprive the general
public of valuable information regarding creditworthiness,217 and it might
prevent entry for new issuers.218 Thus, replacing the issuer-pays model
with an investor-pays model seems impractical. However, permitting "the
issuer to pay for the rating, but not to select the rater" might eliminate the
conflict of interest inherent in the issuer-pays model.219
A second alternative is to have other financial companies, such as
investment advisers, rate certain structured products. The New York
Insurance Department, along with others, is discussing whether other
financial companies, such as BlackRock, PIMCO, Promontory, and Risk
Metrics, could replace CRAs in evaluating the creditworthiness of MBSs
and CDOs.220 This would increase competition in the credit rating business
and reduce over-reliance on CRAs.
A third alternative involves the replacement of credit ratings in
regulation with some market-based measure, such as credit spreads.221
"Credit spreads are more accurate than credit ratings, and by definition
216. See id. at 46 (explaining that, in an investor-pays model, ratings are easy to
communicate to non-paying parties and such accessibility will affect the viability of the
credit rating industry).
217. Id.
218. See id. ("There is a risk that this model induces a bias in favor of established
entities or sectors as investors remain concerned about their current holdings. If it were to
be the case, this result could stifle financial innovation and create barriers to entry for new
issuers.").
219. Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 31.
220. See Yael Bizouati, NY State Wants to Fire Moody’s and S&P, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.businessinsider.com/ny-state-insurance-department-asks-topfirms-to-replace-rating-agencies-2009-9 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (explaining that some
institutions, in an attempt to reduce reliance on CRAs, are seeking credit ratings from
BlackRock, PIMCO and other financial institutions) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). "[In 2009,] a group of state insurance regulators hired PIMCO to replace
rating agencies in analysing mortgage-backed securities held by firms they oversee." The
Other Vampires: Pressure Mounts on an Oligopoly, THE ECONOMIST, May 15, 2010,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16113071. Nevertheless, PIMCO has asserted
that it is not trying to replace CRAs. See Pimco Advisory Unit Tops $1 Trillion in Assets,
MONEYNEWS.COM (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.moneynews.com/FinanceNews/pimcobonds-growth/2009/12/11/id/340764 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) ("We are not strategically
looking to replace the rating agencies, but we believe there is a role for people doing rating
agency type work.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
221. See Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?, supra note 63, at 704
(stating that "a proposal substituting credit spreads for credit ratings in regulation is
workable"). Credit spreads are the market risk measure for bonds. Id. at 624.
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credit spreads reflect the market price of credit, which should reflect at
minimum the information contained in credit ratings."222 The credit spread
is the difference between the yield on a particular bond and its risk-free
counterpart.223 The credit spread is "based on both the probability of
default and the expected recovery in the event of default."224 Lenders rarely
have enough information to calculate these factors with certainty, however,
and as a result, there is fluctuation in credit spreads.225 Thus, credit spreads
are well-reasoned estimates, not certainties. CRAs assert that their ratings
account for additional information that is not reflected in credit spreads.226
However, it is impossible to verify this claim.227 Although this proposal is
persuasive, it might be very difficult to implement, and the initial
substitution of credit spreads for ratings might disrupt credit markets.
The main issue with trying to replace CRAs is the lack of a suitable
alternative. Although experts have proposed a number of alternatives to
CRAs, there does not appear to be a perfect solution to the credit rating
problem. As a result, finding a practical alternative will be more difficult
than originally anticipated.
VII. Barriers to Liability After the Dodd-Frank Act
Although Subtitle C of the Dodd-Frank Act expressly increases CRA
liability and accountability, it is unclear whether certain defenses will
invalidate the relevant Dodd-Frank provisions.228 As stated earlier, CRAs
have avoided liability based on ratings through various exemptions and
defenses, particularly their First Amendment defense.229 Historically,
222. Id. at 624.
223. See id. at 655 ("Credit risk typically is described using the credit spread: the
difference between the yield on a particular bond and the yield on a risk-free bond with
comparable cash-flow characteristics and maturity.").
224. Id. at 656.
225. Id. at 657.
226. Id. at 658.
227. See id. (explaining that even though credit ratings are highly correlated with credit
spreads, it is unclear whether they provide additional informational value).
228. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 27 (stating that there is a
Constitutional question mark that could nullify the Dodd-Frank liability provisions with
respect to CRAs).
229. See Martha Evans et al., Rating Agency Claims, in MORTGAGE AND ASSET BACKED
SECURITIES LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 6.1 (Talcott J. Franklin & Thomas F. Nealon III eds.,
2011) (stating that CRAs defend against liability by asserting that their ratings constitute
speech protected by the First Amendment).
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CRAs have asserted that their business is financial publishing and their core
functions are journalistic.230 CRAs claim that they gather, as well as
analyze, information on matters of public concern and disseminate opinions
based on that information to the public.231 Although CRAs have
successfully raised First Amendment objections in civil litigation, this Note
argues that CRAs are not financial publishers in the context of complex
structured products, and consequently, they should not be exempt from
liability for inaccurate ratings based on a freedom of speech rationale.232
The analysis for deciding whether the First Amendment protects CRAs
is very fact intensive.233 Originally, the First Amendment defense was
plausible because CRAs operated as members of the financial press. CRAs
provided information regarding creditworthiness to subscribing clients,234
and publishers are not liable to their subscribers for negligent erroneous
statements.235 The First Amendment defense arguably became less
plausible in the 1970s when credit ratings were incorporated into various
regulations and CRAs shifted to an issuer-pays model.236 CRAs cannot
plausibly claim that their ratings are opinions when rules and regulations
imbue the ratings with the force of law.237 Nevertheless, courts continued
to recognize the CRAs’ freedom of speech argument.238 With the
230. Partnoy, Other Gatekeepers, supra note 95, at 84.
231. See id. (stating that NRSROs gather information, analyze that information, form
opinions about it, and then disseminate those opinions to the public).
232. See Partnoy, Overdependence, supra note 1, at 13 (stating that rating agencies
should not be exempt from liability for statutory and common law claims based on
journalistic privileges).
233. See David J. Grais & Kostas D. Katsiris, Not "The World’s Shortest Editorial":
Why the First Amendment Does Not Shield the Rating Agencies from Liability for OverRating CDOs, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS 1 (Nov. 2007) ("To tell whether the First
Amendment protects [CRAs], one must first determine whether . . . [CRAs] are members of
‘the press,’ whose freedom the First Amendment guarantees. The answer depends on the
facts of each transaction.").
234. See Jonathan S. Sack & Stephen M. Juris, Rating Agencies: Civil Liability Past
and Future, N.Y. L.J., NOV. 5, 2007 ("Originally, the agencies were compensated by
subscriptions paid for by interested investors.").
235. See Grais & Katsiris, supra note 233, at 2.
236. See Partnoy, Overdependence, supra note 1, at 3 ("For the most part, [CRAs] fit
this reputational investor-pay model until the mid-1970s, when . . . the [SEC] began relying
substantively on [CRAs] for regulatory purposes and the agencies shifted to an issuer-pay
model.").
237. See Bruner & Abdelal, supra note 20, at 207 (explaining that credit ratings have
the force of law because of their regulatory uses, which artificially increase demand for the
ratings of NRSROs).
238. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 27 (stating that judicial decisions
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expansion of securitization, the value of the CRAs’ First Amendment
defense has dissipated.239 Recently, some courts have distinguished
between the traditional functions of CRAs in the context of corporate debt,
as well as government bonds, and the role of CRAs with regard to complex
structured products.240 In the latter context, CRAs do not act as members of
the press, and "it is ‘game over’ for [their] First Amendment defense."241
Because of this distinction, recent case law is divided on whether or not
CRAs should be afforded First Amendment protection.242
A. When Is a CRA a Member of the Press?
Although CRAs assert that the First Amendment protects all their
activities, courts have continuously stated that the First Amendment defense
is not absolute.243 Instead, courts have emphasized that they will determine
have viewed credit ratings as expressions of speech that are protected by the First
Amendment (citing Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Serv., Inc., 175
F.3d 848, 852–56 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 511
F. Supp. 2d 742, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2005)).
239. See Grais & Katsiris, supra note 233, at 1 (stating that CRAs rarely acted as
members of the press in CDO and similar transactions).
240. See Partnoy, Overdependence, supra note 1, at 15–16 ("As new cases based on
‘second-level’ securitizations arise, judges should distinguish those prior cases, and make it
clear that rating agencies are subject to civil liability and are not protected by any First
Amendment privilege."); see also Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that the ratings for stable corporate
bonds differed drastically from the ratings for structured products). See generally In re
Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
241. Grais & Katsiris, supra note 233, at 1.
242. See id. (stating that the case law in the U.S. is divided on the First Amendment
defense issue); see also Evans et al., supra note 229 ("[A] recent spate of suits against rating
agencies has produced seemingly incongruous results in who may recover for inaccurate
ratings."). For examples of cases where the court held that credit ratings are expressions of
opinion protected by the First Amendment, see Jefferson, 175 F.3d at 852–56 (dismissing
claims for tortious interference, injurious falsehood, and antitrust violations because
Moody’s credit ratings are protected expressions of speech); Enron, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 752;
Cnty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., 245 B.R. 151, 157 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("The First
Amendment protects S&P’s preparation and publication of its ratings."). For examples of
cases where the court declined to recognize the CRA’s First Amendment defense, see In re
Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2003); Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. at 176.
243. See Enron, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 819 (stating that any First Amendment protection is
qualified); Commercial Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 109 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2004) (stating that some opinions receive constitutional protection and others do
not); see also McGraw-Hill, 245 B.R. at 154 ("S & P’s status as a financial publisher does
not necessarily entitle it to heightened protection under the First Amendment.").
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whether a CRA acted in a journalistic capacity on a case-by-case basis.244
"[T]he most important factor in determining whether [a CRA] is qualified
to assert the journalist’s privilege is the nature of [the CRA’s] relationship
with the alleged ‘source.’"245 This Part will illustrate the differences
between CRAs and traditional members of the press, particularly in the
structured products context.
Courts consider a number of factors when they evaluate whether or not
a CRA is a member of the press, and therefore deserving of First
Amendment protection. One important factor is whether the CRA only
rates those securities it was hired to rate, or whether it rates all public
debt.246 In Commercial Financial Services, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP,247
the court determined that the First Amendment did not protect CRAs in a
case involving ratings of asset-backed securities partly because Commercial
Financial Services had paid Moody’s to rate its bonds.248 The First
Amendment defense seems more plausible when a CRA rates securities for
the investing public because, in such an instance, the CRA behaves like a
member of the press. Members of the press report about newsworthy
transactions; they do not limit their commentary to stories for which they
are hired.249 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,250 the
244. See Grais & Katsiris, supra note 233, at 2 ("Instead, [courts] have decided case-bycase whether a rating agency was acting as a member of the press, and they will doubtless
continue to do so in suits against rating agencies for over-rating structured securities.").
245. Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862
(E.D. Mich. 2004).
246. See Grais & Katsiris, supra note 233, at 3 ("One important factor is whether the
agency rates most or all securities of a particular kind for the benefit of the investing public,
or instead rates only those securities it is hired to rate.").
247. See Commercial Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2004) (finding inter alia that the First Amendment does not shield the CRAs from
potential liability).
248. See id. at 109 ("The Rating Agencies’ ratings fall somewhere between those
opinions which receive constitutional protection and those that do not."). However, in
Arthur Andersen, the court also noted that it did not agree with the trial court’s granting the
motions to dismiss because CRAs owed a duty of care to Commercial Financial Services, as
Commercial Financial Services paid for the rating. Id. at 110. See also Partnoy, Other
Gatekeepers, supra note 95, at 87 ("The court noted that although a [CRA’s] speech might
be protected, if CFS had hired that [CRA] to write a company report about the bonds, a
different standard would apply.").
249. See In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Unlike a business
newspaper or magazine, which would cover any transactions deemed newsworthy, Fitch
only ‘covers’ its own clients. We believe this practice weighs against treating Fitch like a
journalist.").
250. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
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Court determined that speech motivated by profit deserves less protection
than other forms of speech.251 Most members of the press do not receive
compensation from their subjects.252 A CRA that rates securities for the
investing public is not motivated by monetary gain and is more likely to be
protected by the First Amendment.
Similarly, it is important to determine whether the CRA disseminated
its ratings to a select group of investors or the public at large. In Abu Dhabi
Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,253 the court stated that "where
a [CRA] has disseminated [its] ratings to a select group of investors rather
than to the public at large, the [CRA] is not afforded the same
protection."254 CRAs are more likely to be awarded First Amendment
protection if they make their ratings available to the public at large.255
Additionally, courts consider whether the CRA actively participated in
the structuring of the security.256 As the court explained in In re Fitch,
Inc.,257 communications between the CRA and the issuer "reveal a level of
involvement with the client’s transactions that is not typical of the
relationship between a journalist and the activities upon which the journalist
reports."258 Courts are more sympathetic to the claim that a CRA is entitled

(holding that, in light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of
public concern, "the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive
damages—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice’").
251. See id. at 762–63 (explaining that speech motivated by the desire for profit is less
likely to be deterred than other speech). However, this case dealt with a credit-reporting
agency, not a credit rating agency. See also Arthur Andersen, 94 P.3d at 110 (stating that the
First Amendment does not shield CRAs from potential liability when CRAs are paid by their
clients and the relationship between the issuer and the CRA is more analogous to that of a
client and the client’s accountant).
252. See Fitch, 330 F.3d at 110 (explaining that the fact that Fitch’s activities appear to
be based on client needs, rather than newsworthiness, weighs against Fitch being able to
assert a First Amendment defense).
253. See Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d
155, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that investors stated a claim for fraud against the
rating agencies, and "[a]s a result, the [CRAs’] ratings were not mere opinions but rather
actionable misrepresentations").
254. Id. at 176.
255. Id.
256. See In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that courts
also evaluate the role CRAs play in structuring securities).
257. See id. at 111 (finding that "the district court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that Fitch had not sufficiently shown that the information it sought to protect was
gathered pursuant to the newsgathering activities of a professional journalist").
258. Id. at 110–11.
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to First Amendment protection if it only gathers information from its client
and does not advise the issuer on how to structure the transaction.259
A final factor the courts should consider when analyzing CRA liability
is whether the ratings are used as a certification or a benchmark:
The fact that the market seems to value the agencies’ ratings mostly as a
certification (investment grade v. non-investment grade) or as a
benchmark (the ratings triggers in agreements) and not as information,
and the fact that the law, in hundreds of statutes and regulations, also
uses their work that way, seems to indicate that their ratings are not the
equivalent of editorials in The New York Times. The fact that the rating
agencies have received First Amendment protection for their work
260
should not preclude greater accountability.

Thus, credit ratings are used differently than mere opinions, and CRAs
should not be considered members of the press when their ratings are used
as benchmarks.
In the context of MBSs and CDOs, all of these factors generally weigh
against the assertion that CRAs are financial publishers. The CRAs’ role
has changed significantly in recent history, especially with the development
of complex financial instruments.261 As stated earlier, issuers now pay
CRAs for their ratings, which creates various conflicts of interest.262 In
addition, CRAs play an active role in both rating and advising issuers in the
structuring of complex structured products.263 CRAs determine capital
259. See Partnoy, Other Gatekeepers, supra note 95, at 88 ("[T]he courts have been
more skeptical of free speech claims when the rating agency played a significant role in
structuring a transaction that it rated." (citing In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.
2003))).
260. Id. at 89 n.104 (quoting STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH
CONG., FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE SECTOR WATCHDOGS 97
(Comm. Print Oct. 7, 2002)).
261. See Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied
Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation
Market Disruptions 8 (Working Paper, May 14, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027475 (explaining how the CRA
industry has changed since the 1970s).
262. See Lisbeth Freeman, Note, Who’s Guarding the Gate? Credit-Rating Agency
Liability as "Control Person" in the Subprime Credit Crisis, 33 VT. L. REV. 585, 605 (2009)
(stating that CRAs play a more active role in the issuance of complex financial products).
"[T]he existence of a well-function[ing] information intermediary faltered. The [CRAs]
faced little or no risk of loss from inaccurate ratings, while the potential gains from
inaccurate ratings increased. Ratings substantially lagged the revelation of public
information about rated issuers and instruments, and [CRAs] . . . were forced to revise
ratings . . . downward[s]." Partnoy, Overdependence, supra note 1, at 3–4.
263. See Partnoy, Overdependence, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that rating agencies are
doing much more than speaking and have a "high level of initial and ongoing involvement in
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cushions required for the tranches of CDOs and MBSs.264 They also are
involved in the issuer’s processes on an ongoing basis.265 Unlike corporate
and government bond transactions, the rating of CDOs and MBSs usually
involves the use of the CRAs’ mathematical models and assumptions.266
CRAs also derive significant amounts of revenue from the rating of
complex financial products, which enhances the conflict of interest problem
associated with the issuer-pays model.267 These changes suggest that credit
ratings are not merely opinions, and as a result, the ratings of CRAs should
not be afforded First Amendment protection.268
In the context of MBSs and CDOs, all of these factors generally weigh
against the assertion that CRAs are journalists. "[CRAs] rarely if ever rate
securities they are not hired to rate; reliable information suggests that they
often commented (or did until recently) on how a security could be
structured to achieve a desired rating; and almost all CDOs and similar
instruments are placed privately and confidentially."269 CRAs rate
structured products for their own benefit, not to comment on public issues.
Even if courts consider CRAs members of the press in the context of
structured products, CRAs should still be held accountable for their inflated
ratings when CRAs consciously disregard the accuracy or methodology
these deals"). These factors raise significant conflict of interest concerns. Bankers, issuers,
and investors continuously make pitches to CRA employees, and such views can influence
credit judgments. Amit R. Paley, Credit-Rating Firms Grilled Over Conflicts, WASHINGTON
POST, Oct. 23, 2008, at A01. Many plaintiffs in CRA liability actions argue that CRAs have
a "financial stake in assigning high ratings to securities in that high ratings would generate
higher-volume trading in structured finance securities, which would positively affect
[CRAs’] business." Connecticut v. Moody’s Corp., No. 3:10CV546(JBA), 2011 WL 63905,
at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 2011). Because a lower rating might affect future business, CRAs
might be tempted to inflate the ratings of lower-quality securities. Furthermore, issuers
sometimes condition payment of fees on the issuance of desired ratings. Deats, supra note
10, at 1820 (citing Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 651 F.
Supp. 2d 155, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). Thus, investors might not receive accurate reports on
creditworthiness. In the past, CRAs let "corporate greed trump their responsibility to
provide unbiased appraisals for investors." Paley, supra.
264. Partnoy, Overdependence, supra note 1, at 16.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See id. (stating that CRAs earn significantly higher fees from ratings of secured
products).
268. See id. (stating that "judges should reject the claim that ratings of second-level
securitizations are merely ‘opinions’").
269. Grais & Katsiris, supra note 233, at 3. CRAs normally rate structured securities
like CDOs only for a fee, and they often participate in the structuring of the securities. Id. at
4. In addition, these structured securities are usually sold and traded privately. Id.
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underlying their ratings. Analysts knew that they did not have enough data
about the mortgages that made up the CDOs and MBSs that they rated.270
Internal documents at various CRAs suggest that analysts and directors
knew they were overrating various securities.271 In April 2007, two S&P
analysts acknowledged in an instant message conversation that S&P’s
"model def [sic] does not capture half of the . . . risk [associated with the
deal]."272 One of the analysts later noted that "[a deal] could be structured
by cows and [they] would rate it."273 It appears that more senior employees
were aware of these moral issues, and in September 2007, one managing
director stated, "[w]e had blinders on and never questioned the information
we were given . . . . These errors make us look either incompetent at credit
analysis, or like we sold our souls to the devil for revenue, or a little bit of
both."274
B. Is CRA Liability Practical?
Although most people agree that CRAs need to be held accountable
following the recent financial crisis, the issue of control and regulation of
CRAs is very complex. And although increased regulation and the threat of
liability would most likely deter misbehavior, enforcement is probably
impractical.275 A liberalized negligence standard could drastically affect the
financial markets and the CRA industry.276 An increased number of civil
270. Ronald D. Orol, Competition, Lack of Data Drove Flawed Credit Ratings,
MARKETWATCH (April 23, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/competition-lack-ofdata-drove-flawed-ratings-2010-04-23 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) ("Based on emails
reviewed by the committee, [Sen. Carl] Levin found that the credit raters not only didn’t
have enough data about the mortgages that made up mortgage securities, but also they knew
they didn’t have that information.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Furthermore, S&P knew that its CDO model was flawed. Id.
271. Paley, supra note 263.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. In December 2006, a high-ranking official at S&P took a more whimsical tone
in describing the risks of MBSs and wrote: "Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the
time this house of cards falters." Id.
275. See Pinto, supra note 14, at 355 ("While liability has the positive effect of
deterring bad behavior and creating norms, it may also lead to frivolous litigation and credit
rating firms concerned over liability limiting the issuers they cover thus lessening the
amount of information for investors.").
276. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 27 ("Although the case for
enhanced liability may be strong, three distinct policy reasons suggest that a liberalized
negligence standard is ill-advised.").
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claims could result in crushing liability for CRAs.277 The goal of the DoddFrank Act and CRA legislation should be deterrence, not compensation.278
Investors throughout the world have invested in trillions of dollars worth of
structured products.279 It is unrealistic to think that CRAs could
compensate most of their victims for losses associated with inaccurate CDO
and MBS ratings.280 "[A] single case could produce a billion dollar (or
greater) judgment."281 Typically, the mistakes of CRAs involve multiple
securities issuances. As a result, an error by a CRA may affect the ratings
of dozens (or even hundreds) of issuers, causing billions of dollars in
damages.282
Catherine Odelbo, Morningstar’s President of Equity
Research, stated that "[t]his is Arthur Andersen-type liability; it can bring
your company down."283
The threat of such liability could lead CRAs to stop rating complex
structured securities, which in turn, could further paralyze housing finance
in the United States.284 This will reduce the amount of information
available to the investing public.285 Many CRAs have scaled back their
rating operations because some clients are unable to supply the information
required under the Dodd-Frank Act.286 CRAs are concerned that including
ratings in registration statements pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act could
expose them to expert liability.287 Following the enactment of the Dodd277. See id. at 27–28 (explaining that a negligence standard could bankrupt the CRAs).
278. Id. at 28.
279. See id. ("[T]rillions of dollars in structured finance products have been marketed
globally.").
280. See id. (explaining that CRAs could not realistically compensate even a small
percentage of the losses associated with structured securities).
281. See id.
282. Id. "[B]ecause a misjudgment by a CRA may enable a far greater dollar volume of
securities to be sold, the need for deterrence is strong, but the case for a ceiling on its
liability may even be stronger." Id.
283. Lippert, supra note 13.
284. See Coffee, supra note 186, at 28 (stating that the threat of increased liability could
force the CRAs to stop rating certain structured products and explaining that "if the CRAs
were to cease to rate structured finance products . . . housing finance in the U.S. might
remain paralyzed").
285. Sack & Juris, supra note 234.
286. See Lippert, supra note 13 (stating that Fitch stopped grading development bonds
from six port authorities in Ohio in August). The small firms that operate around the ports
"don’t have the audited financial statements Fitch demanded." Id.
287. See Sarah Mulholland & Jody Shenn, SEC Grants Six-Month Delay for Ratings
Disclosure on Asset-Backed Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 23, 2010), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-23/sec-grants-six-month-delay-for-ratings-disclosure-on-assetbacked-bonds.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) ("Fitch Ratings remains concerned that
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Frank Act, CRAs advised clients not to use their ratings in prospectuses and
registration statements.288 Furthermore, the asset-backed securities (ABS)
market froze up after CRAs refused to take expert liability as required by
the Dodd-Frank Act.289 CRAs were unwilling to grant issuers their consent
to include the CRA’s ratings in the issuer’s registration statement, and sales
were delayed.290 As a result, the SEC took a no-action position against the
CRAs in order to prevent a primary market issuance shutdown.291 The noaction policy provided members of the securitization industry and
regulators the opportunity to craft a compromise that would preserve the
securitization markets.292 Initially, the reprieve was expected to last six
months. However, on November 23, 2010, the SEC extended the no-action
policy indefinitely.293 This policy allowed ABS issuers to omit ratings from
their offering documents.294
In the extreme, CRAs concerned about liability exposure may
relinquish their NRSRO status in order to avoid liability. Current and

including its ranking in prospectuses and registration statements under the new law may
expose the firm to expert liability, though the SEC action should offer market participants a
window to modify practices as appropriate . . . .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
288. See Anusha Shrivastava, Bond Sale? Don’t Quote Us, Request Credit Firms,
WALL ST. J., July 21, 2010, at C1 (explaining that CRAs have requested that clients don’t use
their ratings until the CRAs get a better understanding of their legal exposure under the
Dodd-Frank Act); Jesse Eisinger, Postcrisis, A Struggle over Mortgage Bond Ratings,
DEALBOOK (Jan. 5, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/after-financial-crisis-astruggle-over-rating-mortgage-bonds/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (stating that the CRAs
refused to allow their ratings to be used in offerings following the enactment of the DoddFrank Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
289. Jacob Gaffney, Credit Rating Agency Reform: The Best Action Is No Action,
HOUSINGWIRE (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.housingwire.com/2010/11/24/credit-ratingagency-reform-the-best-action-is-no-action (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
290. Mulholland & Shenn, supra note 287.
291. Gaffney, supra note 289. "No action policies" are policies by SEC staff members
indicating that they will not recommend that the SEC undertake enforcement action against a
party for a particular activity.
SEC, No Action Letters (Mar. 5, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
292. Id.
293. Bingham McCutchen LLP, Dodd-Frank Act’s Impact on Rating Agencies as the
ABS Market Continues to Evolve (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.bingham.com/
Media.aspx?MediaID=11652 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
294. Mulholland & Shenn, supra note 287.
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pending legislation seeks to regulate only NRSROs.295 It is hard to believe
that unrecognized CRAs would build up their reputations to become
NRSROs if such a status would subject them to increased liability,
particularly with decreased reliance on ratings in regulation.296 If the DoddFrank Act reduces reliance on credit ratings in regulations and increases
potential liability, NRSROs will be subjected to increased costs with
decreasing benefits. In addition, if the NRSROs choose to give up their
NRSRO status, issuers, investment advisers, and other market players will
not be able to satisfy various regulations requiring ratings from NRSROs.297
Thus, the threat of increased liability for CRAs might be impractical.
Indeed, increased liability will lead to increased costs for issuers and
investors.298 CRAs might charge higher fees to pay for the increased costs
associated with due diligence and to cover the costs of future damages from
lawsuits and the costs associated with new regulations. Harold McGraw,
Chief Executive Officer of McGraw-Hill Companies, told investors that
S&P is "raising prices to help pay for increased regulatory requirements."299
Shortly after the Dodd-Frank Act was passed, Moody’s increased its fee for
a $325 million bond issue 61% from a similar deal in 2009.300 If CRAs

295. Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 43.
296. See Richard Beales, Cleaning Up the Ratings Agencies, CNNMONEY (Sept. 30,
2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/30/news/economy/ratings_agencies_regulation.break
ingviews/index.htm?postversion=2009093014 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) ("[I]f Congress
were to insist that raters shoulder significant liability for ratings that turned out badly, or
tried to legislate the criteria that rating firms use . . . that might just drive them to forgo
privileged NRSRO status in order to avoid the weight of the associated shackles.") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also E-mail from Charles D. Brown,
General Counsel, Fitch Ratings, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC, (Dec. 14, 2009),
available at http://www.fitchratingsasia.com/web_content/nrsro/fitch_comment_on_propos
ed_sec_rule_and_concept_release_2009Dec14.pdf ("The [nullification of Rule 436(g)]
seems to defeat the entire purpose of becoming an NRSRO if one of the perceived benefits
of recognition (use of the credit ratings by registrants) creates a significant, new liability.").
297. Cf. Beales, supra note 296 (explaining that sanctioned ratings would have to be
ripped out of laws and regulations if CRAs gave up their NRSRO status).
298. See Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?, supra note 63, at 646
(stating that "[CRAs] reduced both investors’ cost of information and issuers’ cost of
capital" (citing Amy K. Rhodes, The Role of the SEC in the Regulation of Rating Agencies:
Well-Placed Reliance or Free-Market Interference?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 293, 294–95
(1996))).
299. Lippert, supra note 13.
300. See id. ("On July 19, four days after Congress passed the law, Moody’s asked
Montgomery County, Maryland, to pay $98,400 to rate a $325 million bond—boosting the
fee [61%] from a similar deal in 2009.").
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continue to increase fees to account for increased costs and liability, it is
safe to assume that issuers will pass those costs on to investors.301
C. Liability Cap Proposal
The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to hold CRAs to a higher standard of
accountability for their ratings by providing incentives for CRAs to be
objective.302 However, the policy reasons discussed above suggest that
imposing liability on CRAs might be more difficult than originally
anticipated.303 This Note asserts that the government can increase CRA
accountability while also limiting the social and political side effects of
increased liability by implementing a liability-based system with a cap on
liability.304
Although CRAs have come under intense pressure from investors,
legislators, regulators, and courts following the recent financial crisis, they
are a vital and necessary component of the global financial system. CRAs
provide a public good by eliminating information asymmetries and
providing comprehensive coverage of debt offerings.305 At the present
time, there are no practical alternatives that could replace CRAs.306
Consequently, regulators and courts must use the threat of liability to deter
improper behavior and ensure accurate ratings. However, as explained
earlier, increased liability related to inaccurate ratings could result in
301. See Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?, supra note 63, at 652
(explaining that issuers pass on the costs of ratings by paying a lower interest rate on debt
issues); see also Jessica Holzer & Luca Di Leo, US Bank Regulators Concerned About
Credit-Ratings Ban, AUTOMATED TRADER (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.automatedtrader.net/
real-time-dow-jones/47542/-us-bank-regulators-concerned-about-credit_ratings-ban
(last
visited Nov. 29, 2011) ("Dodd-Frank is a ‘goldmine’ for government workers, lobbyists and
lawyers but, for most Americans, it will mean ‘more red-tape, more government, fewer
choices and higher fees.’") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
302. See Eisinger, supra note 288 ("‘For ratings reform to be successful it needs to
provide incentives for rating agencies to be objective,’ said Gene Phillips, a former Moody’s
analyst who runs a ratings consulting firm. ‘The Dodd-Frank act achieves some of that, but
absent legal liability, or accountability, it’s much weaker.’").
303. See supra Part VII.B (explaining why increased liability for CRAs might be
impractical).
304. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 28 ("[A]ny cause of action against
the CRAs should logically be coupled with a ceiling on liability to ensure that the deterrent
threat does not lead to the financial destruction of an arguably necessary financial
intermediary.").
305. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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crushing liability and bankrupt the entire CRA industry.307 Such unlimited
liability is not a viable option until legislators and regulators can find a
practical alternative to CRAs. One way to mitigate the risk of crushing
liability is to cap the liability exposure of CRAs. By implementing a
liability cap on damages, courts will provide CRAs with incentives for
compliance with rules and regulations without jeopardizing their financial
viability.308
Although increased liability will impose greater costs on CRAs, CRAs
will not be exposed to unreasonable financial burdens under a cap
system.309 The threat of liability, albeit limited, will still "heighten the
already substantial leverage that [CRAs] have to demand additional
information before agreeing to certify ratings, and provide both [CRAs] and
issuers with incentives to spend more time examining disclosures more
thoroughly."310 A liability cap system will result in more reliable credit
ratings.
The difficulty with implementing a liability cap system is determining
the cap. Some scholars have already proposed imposing limited liability
regimes with regard to CRAs. Professor Manns of George Washington
University Law School has proposed implementing an earnings-based cap
on liability and limiting CRAs’ financial liability to cases of gross
negligence.311 Professor Coffee has proposed a modified form of strict
liability for CRAs (and other gatekeepers) that would cap obligations at a
multiple of annual revenues.312 Professor Partnoy, of the University of San
Diego, has proposed a system based on a percentage of damages.313
307. See supra Part VII.B (explaining the effect of a liberalized negligence standard on
CRA liability).
308. See Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee
Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1076 (2009) ("Limiting
rating agencies’ financial liability to cases of gross negligence, coupled with an earningsbased cap on liability and other safeguards, would provide rating agencies with incentives
for compliance without jeopardizing their financial viability.").
309. Id. at 1076–77.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1076.
312. See Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee,
84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 365 (2004) ("Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. proposes a modified form of
strict liability for gatekeepers (other than attorneys), which would convert gatekeepers into
insurers but cap their insurance obligations based on a multiple of the highest annual
revenues the gatekeepers recently had received from their wrongdoing clients."). Because
potential damages are astronomical, Professor Coffee concludes that it would be too costly
for gatekeepers to internalize liability costs through higher fees. Id. at 370.
313. Id. at 365–66.
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This Note asserts that damages for CRA liability in the context of
structured products should be limited to a percentage or small multiple of
fees earned from the individual debt issue, which the CRA improperly
rated. It is unrealistic to hold CRAs liable for the full value of the issues
they rate because it could subject them to crushing liability.314 CRAs have
rated trillions of dollars’ worth of debt, yet they have earned only a fraction
of that amount in fees.315 Thus, liability must be limited to a fraction, or at
most a small multiple of the fees CRAs earn. Furthermore, the liability cap
should differ depending on the level of negligence. In assessing damages,
courts should use different caps depending on whether the CRA’s actions
constitute simple negligence or something more, such as gross negligence
or recklessness.
If the CRA is simply negligent, liability should be limited to some
percentage of the fee earned, not to exceed the total fee. Although society
wants to discourage negligence, courts must realize that, in the context of
structured products, the credit rating process is extremely complex and
more susceptible to negligent activity. Consequently, when a CRA is
simply negligent, it should not be liable for more than the fee earned. Some
might argue that such a cap will encourage under-deterrence because it is
too low. However, CRAs will be more diligent and cautious throughout the
rating process if they realize that they might lose entire fees for simple
negligence. This is especially true in the context of CDOs and MBSs
because CRAs earn significant revenue from rating structured products.316
Furthermore, calculating damages based on the fee earned is relatively
straightforward and simple. In comparison, a liability cap based on
multiples of revenues is much more difficult to determine.317

314. See supra Part VII.B (explaining that increased liability could bankrupt the CRA
industry).
315. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 186, at 28 ("Given that trillions of dollars
in structured finance products have been marketed globally, there is no realistic possibility
that the [CRAs] could fund meaningful compensation to most [of] their victims. Their
pockets are simply not deep enough to cover even a small percentage of the losses . . . .");
Jonathan Katz, Emanuel Salinas & Constantinos Stephanou, Credit Rating Agencies, THE
WORLD BANK GROUP 7 n.5 (Oct. 2009), available at http://rru.world
bank.org/documents/CrisisResponse/Note8.pdf (stating that S&P earns 3–4 basis points of
the issue size for rating corporate debt issues and up to ten basis points for rating complex
transactions (citing Partnoy, Other Gatekeepers, supra note 95)).
316. See Smith, supra note 130 (stating that CRAs earn as much as three times more
revenue for rating complex MBSs and CDOs than they do rating corporate debt).
317. See Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers, supra note 312, at 371 (stating that
"calculating a revenues multiple is fraught with technical difficulties").
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If a CRA is grossly negligent or reckless, the liability cap should be up
to three times the total fee earned from that debt issue.318 Although gross
negligence is a vague term, some describe gross negligence as acts or
omissions that exhibit a reckless indifference to the rights of others.319
According to some, gross negligence is willful and constitutes reckless
behavior.320 Under the proposed scheme, CRAs risk losing entire fees and
incurring punitive damages if they are grossly negligent or reckless. The
increased cap is logical in the context of reckless or grossly negligent
behavior because such behavior is willful or intentional. Thus, more is
needed to deter similar behavior in the future. However, the courts should
be sure not to bankrupt the CRAs. In this situation, treble damages seem
appropriate because many statutes in the law impose double or treble
damages where some element of recklessness or willfulness entered into the
act.321
In determining the appropriate damages, courts should balance
deterrence factors against the financial burden imposed on CRAs and the
risk of market failure in the market for CRA services. This tier-based
system with liability caps should be adopted because it offers an
appropriate model for deterring CRA misconduct without bankrupting
CRAs.
VIII. Conclusion
CRAs are currently under fire for their failure to adequately assess
risks associated with complex structured finance products. Many experts
have suggested eliminating CRAs altogether and finding some other
alternative to assess credit risk. Although complete elimination of CRAs
seems impractical, CRAs must be held accountable for their ratings. This
Note asserts that the Dodd-Frank Act will increase CRA accountability and
318. Cf. Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, supra 308, at 1076
(stating that CRAs’ liability should be limited to cases of gross negligence). "A gross
negligence approach would impose liability for [CRAs’] failures to identify or engage in
diligence of risks of such a nature and degree that the failure constitutes a gross deviation
from a reasonable person’s standard of care". Id. However, "[CRAs] would only have to
show slight care or diligence in identifying and assessing risks to avoid liability for gross
negligence, which is a modest standard to satisfy." Id. at 1079.
319. See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 91 (2010) ("It has been considered that gross
negligence consists in such lack of care as evidences recklessness.").
320. Id.
321. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 619 (2010).
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liability. Furthermore, it argues that CRAs should not be afforded First
Amendment protection in the context of MBSs and CDOs; CRAs are much
more than financial publishers in this context. Legislators and courts,
however, must be careful not to impose crushing liability on CRAs. This
Note asserts that the United States can deter the type of behavior that
facilitated the recent financial crisis while simultaneously protecting CRAs
from crushing liability by implementing a tier-based liability system with
different caps depending on the type of misconduct.

